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 The peace negotiation between the Government Republic of the Philippines and 
the secessionist Moro Islamic Liberation Front which started in 1997 during the time of 
former President Fidel V. Ramos went through turbulent times in the year 2000 when the 
succeeding President, Joseph Estrada, failed to continue the momentum of the peace 
initiative and instead declared an “all out war” in dealing with the rebel group.  When 
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo became president in 2001, she turned the “all out war” policy 
into an all out peace, which opened up hopes for the peaceful resolution of the conflict.  
Peace negotiations between the GRP and the MILF were resurrected and both sides have 
re-affirmed their commitment to a negotiated political settlement as the only solution to 
the conflict. This thesis analyzes the prospect for a sustainable peace between the GRP 
and MILF by looking at the following variables: (1) the conflict and its ripeness for 
resolution, (2) the ongoing peace process, and (3) the involvement of external actors. 
General findings of this study indicate a good prospect for a comprehensive peace 
agreement next year and a good chance for its implementation due to the favorable 
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A.  BACKGROUND 
The southern Philippines has been greatly affected by the problem of Muslim 
secessionist insurgency for more than three decades now.1 The Moro (Filipino Muslim) 
armed struggle, which originated from a combination of socio-political factors in the 
early 20th century exploded in the early 1970s and persisted through waves of violence 
that had its peak again in the year 2000. In this independence struggle, two main rebel 
factions have emerged and one small terrorist group: the secular nationalist Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF), established by Nur Misuari in 19712 which forged a 
final peace agreement with the Philippine government in 1996;3  the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF), whose main goal is to establish an  independent Islamic state, a 
breakaway group from the MNLF established officially in 1980 by Salamat Hashim4; and 
the small Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) which is advocating an exclusive theocratic Islamic 
state founded by Abdurajak Janjalani in 1989. The ASG is known for its religious 
intolerance and violence against Christians,5 but it deteriorated into a high profile kidnap-
for-ransom group after the death of its founder in 1998.  
The GRP-MNLF peace agreement in 1996 resulted in a split among MNLF 
members who were willing to compromise independence and those who were not. Some 
                                                 
1 Rizal G Buendia. “The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: Ethno-Religious War or Economic 
Conflict?,” in The Politics of Death: Political Violence in South East Asia, eds. Aurel Croissant, Sacha 
Kneip, and Beate Martin (forthcoming), 3.  
2 Ibid. 
3 In September 1996, the Philippine government under President Fidel V Ramos successfully reached 
a Final Peace Agreement (FPA) with the MNLF. This agreement provided for the Moros’ wider political  
and economic powers through the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and Southern 
Philippines Council for Development (SPCPD). Rizal G Buendia, “The Mindanao Conflict in the 
Philippines: Ethno-Religious War or Economic Conflict?,” in The Politics of Death: Political Violence in 
South East Asia, eds. Aurel Croissant, Sacha Kneip, and Beate Martin (forthcoming); Ronald J. May, 
“Muslim Mindanao: Four Years After the Peace Agreement,” in South East Asian Affairs, (2001); Ricardo 
A. David, NPS MA Thesis paper on “The Causes and Prospects of the Southern Philippines Secessionist 
Movement,” (2003). 
4 Peter Chalk, “Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, 
and Aceh,” in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 24:241-269, (Taylor & Francis, 2001), 247. 
5 Ibid., 248. 
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MNLF members joined the government through the Autonomous Region for Muslim 
Mindanao and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development, and those 
who did not agree with the compromise joined the MILF. As a result, the MILF 
eventually gained more members reaching as high as 15,0006 and became the primary 
vanguard of the Moros’ struggle for independence. In the year 2000, the conflict between 
the government and the MILF reached its peak. Heavy fighting erupted costing the lives 
of 200 soldiers,7 47 civilians, an unaccounted number of Muslim rebels, and about 
160,000 families displaced.8 The fighting caused the destruction of several MILF major 
camps, including its main camp Abubakar in Maguindanao. However, its tactical defeat 
by government forces did not stop the MILF from conducting guerilla attacks and the 
situation from deteriorating. When Gloria Macapagal Arroyo became President in 2001, 
she offered a ceasefire and invited the MILF rebels to the peace negotiation. After several 
exploratory talks through the mediation of Malaysia and Libya, both the GRP and the 
MILF agreed to the following substantive agenda: security, rehabilitation and ancestral 
domain.9 However, peace negotiations had been shaken by incidents of fighting between 
the soldiers and rebels in early 2003. Nevertheless, the peace initiatives managed to 
continue in mid 2003. Since then, the peace dialogue between the GRP and the MILF has 
slowly been progressing.  
                                                 
6 Chalk, 247. 
7 Numbers of deaths on the MILF side is not available but it is widely believed that they have suffered 
heavy losses in the fighting when several of its camps were assaulted and overran by the military in 2000. 
Ricardo A. David, NPS M.A. Thesis paper on “The Causes and Prospects of the Southern Philippines 
Secessionist Movement.” (2003), 103. 
8 Fermin Adriano et al, “ Mindanao’s Agenda for Peace and Development” cited from Rizal G 
Buendia, The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: Ethno-Religious War or Economic Conflict?, in The 
Politics of Death: Political Violence in Southeast Asia, eds. Aurel Croissant, Sacha Kneip, and Beate 
Martin (forthcoming), 7. 
9 International Crisis Group (ICG) Asia Report N 80, “Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism 
and the Peace Process,” (2004), 7, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2863&l=1 (accessed 02 
Sept 05).  
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B.  PURPOSE 
This thesis paper examines the prospects for a sustainable peace between the 
Government Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) in view of the ongoing peace initiatives of both sides with the support of 
Malaysia, the U.S., and other external actors. For this purpose, sustainable peace is 
defined as a relatively peaceful condition wherein both the GRP and the MILF remain 
committed to the peaceful settlement of the conflict and will stay cooperatively peaceful 
in the future implementation of a final peace agreement. Failure to achieve a sustainable 
peace condition between the GRP and MILF would likely result in the resumption of 
violence. The three decades of fighting in Muslim Mindanao has already submerged the 
region and its people into deep poverty and lawlessness. It is also feared that Mindanao 
may become a major breeding ground for terrorist groups due to the growing presence of 
a regional terrorist group called Jemaah Islamiyah10  if the MILF conflict is not 
peacefully resolved. 
C.  LITERATURE REVIEW  
1. Literature on the Nature of Conflict, Causes, and Recommendations 
The MILF insurgency is mainly a case of an ethno-nationalistic conflict between 
the majority Christians and the minority Muslims in the Philippines as the former has 
dominated the latter over the past decades. According to Paul Collier, ethnic dominance 
ranging from 45% to 95% is as prone to a civil conflict as a homogenous society is. He 
states that “having 45 percent or more of the population is sufficient in a democracy to 
give the group permanent control.”11 This being the case, the minority may suffer from 
exploitation because of limited political powers and the resources from the minority may 
be captured by the majority. Such conditions of potential exploitation create fear among 
                                                 
10 Jemaah Islamiya is a regional terrorist group whose goal is to establish an Islamic state centered in 
Indonesia. It was founded by two Indonesian clerics Abu Bakar Baasyir and Abdullah Sungkar who have 
been very much influenced by the puritanical Wahhabi interpretation of Islam. CRS Report for U.S. 
Congress, “Terrorism in South East Asia,” (5 Oct 2004), 17-21, 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/35595.pdf (accessed 13 Oct 05).  
11 Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Conflict;” in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing 
International Conflict, eds. Chester A Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall. (Washington DC, 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 155. 
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the minorities which may eventually drive them to fight.12 In the Philippines, Christians 
dominate the country, having 92% of the population, of which 89% are Catholics, while 
the Muslims comprise only around 4.5%.13 The Muslims are concentrated in the 
Mindanao region, southern part of the country and known as the conflict area, where they 
are 18% of the total population.14 Today, Muslim majority populations are mainly 
concentrated in five out of the 25 provinces in Mindanao, namely: Basilan, Lanao del 
Sur, Maguindano, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, and one city, Marawi.15 Some of the main issues 
of the conflict are the political marginalization and landlessness of the minority Muslims. 
Andrew Tan referred to the huge influx of Christian migrants in the early to mid-20th 
century that caused the disadvantaged Muslims to lose their lands through dubious legal 
means or outright confiscation.16  
Robert Gurr argues that an ethno-nationalistic struggle is potentially explosive 
due to the strong shared identity of members and leaders who see a collective incentive 
for their political action. Their capacities to launch a collective action and the 
opportunities in their political environment also increase the intensity of their struggle.17  
In this conflict, the Moro identity served to be the unifying factor for the Filipino 
Muslims who perceive themselves as being treated unjustly by the majority Filipino 
Christians. By seceding Mindanao, they can establish their own political powers and 
benefit from the region’s natural resources. The capacity of the Moros to launch an armed 
struggle was also heightened by the fact that they are concentrated in areas of Mindanao 
and also due to the involvement of external supporters. 
                                                 
12 Collier, 155. 
13 CIA World Factbook, “Philippines,” http://www. 
cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rp.html#People (accessed 05 Sept 05). 
14 Nathan Quimpo,  “Options in the Pursuit of Just, Comprehensive, and Stable Peace in the southern 
Philippines,” Asian Survey. Vol. 41, No.2. (Mar-Apr 2001).  
15 “Mindanao Data,” Wikipedia: Free encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mindanao (accessed 
08 Oct 05). 
16 Andrew Tan, “Armed Muslim separatist in South East Asia: Persistence, Prospects and 
Implications” in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, (Francis & Taylor, 2000), 271. 
17 Robert Gurr, “Minorities and Nationalists: Managing Ethno Political Conflict in the 20th Century,” 
in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International conflict, eds. Chester A Crocker, Fen Osler 
Hampson, and Pamela Aall. (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 167. 
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Similarly, Rizal G. Buendia argues that the “centralism of the state that restricts 
Muslim self governance, socio-economic deprivation and the historical biases and 
prejudices between Muslims and Christians are the causes of the ethnic minority 
Muslim’s armed struggle for secession.”18 The highly centralized political structure and 
administration have not provided substantial political powers to the ethnic Muslims and 
have seemingly marginalized the Muslims from having greater political powers, both at 
local and national levels. The national government in Manila has also caused the socio-
economic deprivation of the Muslims in Mindanao by failing to bring economic 
development in the area. Malapit, et al, explain this widespread poverty in Mindanao as 
having a strong linkage with violent conflict and a more likely occurrence of chronic 
poverty.19  
In view of his arguments, Buendia endorsed the need for providing greater 
political powers to the Muslim minorities. He is supportive of the current debate in the 
Philippines for a constitutional change. That is, changing the current system of 
Presidential unitary government into a parliamentary-federal government. This will 
provide a separate state to the Bangsamoro people where they can exercise greater 
political powers and economic jurisdictions.  
Fianza emphasizes the ancestral land issue as a major cause for the recurring 
conflict in Mindanao. She argues that “conflict is rooted to the land question triggered by 
the issue of equitable access to land and resources or rights to a territory that contesting 
groups view should be acquired or reclaimed not solely on the basis of economic rights to 
private property in the western liberal sense, or from a more progressive standpoint of 
redistributive reform, but as a determinant of the survival of a community and their 
culture, the basis of their identity as a people.”20 
                                                 
18 Buendia, 2. 
19 Hazel  Malapit et al, “Does Violent Conflict Make Chronic Poverty more likely? The Mindanao 
Experience” (2003), 12, http://www.chronicpoverty.org/pdfs/conferencepapers/malapit.pdf (accessed 10 
May 05). 
20 Myrthena L Fianza, “Contesting Land and Identity in the Periphery: The Moro Indigenous People of 
Southern Philippines” http://www.iascp2004.org (accessed 10 May 2005). 
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Eleanor Dictaan-Bang-oa discusses contemporary efforts aimed at peace building 
and sustainable development in Mindanao that began after the 1996 Final Peace 
Agreement (FPA) between the GRP and the MNLF.21 She notes the economic initiatives 
undertaken by UNDP, World Bank, USAID, and GRP in support of achieving sustainable 
peace. These involved infusions of financial aid to livelihood projects. However, these 
efforts were hampered by both internal and external factors in the post-conflict 
environment that followed. She cites the difficulty brought about by the damaged social 
capital problem. The capability to trust, among others, was damaged by the long years of 
conflict and deception. Sadly, former MNLF commanders who came into power proved 
to be ill equipped to run an effective administration. Furthermore, corruption took center 
stage among many Muslim officials, thus complicating the bureaucratic process of the 
already slow implementation of economic support.22 Nonetheless, there are also success 
stories like the ELAP-USAID seaweed farming project in Sulu, the multi-purpose 
cooperative, and the SPCPD-UN-NEDA Livelihood Assistance Project.23 In her 
recommendation, she also focused on the “recognition of the indigenous peoples’ right to 
own, manage and control their lands and resources” as the main issue to address.  
Despite the disruption of the ceasefire in 2003, the GRP and the MILF have been 
able to advance the talks on the substantive agenda of security, rehabilitation, and 
ancestral domain that were outlined in the 2001 Tripoli agreement. The Tripoli accord 
has become the mother agreement in which the three cited agenda would be addressed 
and hopefully result in a political settlement.  Issues for political settlement include 
granting independence to majority areas of the Moros and giving expanded autonomy, or 
accommodating a Bangsamoro state under a new Federal Republic of the Philippines. So 
far, the first two agenda were easily resolved and the only remaining agenda of the three 
is the issue of ancestral domain, which is considered complex and contentious.24 Having 
                                                 
21 Eleanor Dictaan-Bang-oa, “The Question of Peace in Mindanao, Southern Philippines” (2004), 154, 
http://www.undp.org/csco/resource/cso (accessed 10 May 05). 
22 Ibid, 161. 
23 Ibid. 
24 International Crisis Group (ICG) Asia Report, “Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and 
the Peace Process,” (13 July 2004), http://www.icg.org  (accessed 01 Aug 05). 
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included the land issue in the peace negotiation today provides a better chance for the 
resolution of the conflict because this issue had not been addressed in the past peace 
negotiations with the MNLF, and considering it remains a valid and crucial issue of 
today. 
Col. Ricardo David recognizes the ethno-nationalistic and socio-economic 
dimensions of the Moro insurgency. He is convinced that the solution to the problem is a 
political settlement coupled with developmental assistance. “Unless these are addressed 
by the GRP and the MILF in the current negotiations, the Moro nationalistic struggle will 
continue to remain a problem.”25  Col. Ricardo Morales pointed at flawed governmental 
approaches to the Moro insurgency as to why it has been going on for more than three 
decades now. Accordingly, the government failed to seize the opportunity to end the 
conflict after the rebels were weakened by military combat operations in the mid-1970s.26 
In view of the year 2000 major offensives by the military, wherein the MILF has been 
weakened, the current peace process is now an opportunity for the government to end the 
conflict.  
2. General Writings on Conflict Settlements 
Analyzing peace settlements between parties in conflict is a complex undertaking 
due to the peculiarity of each case of conflict under study. However, studies showed that 
certain variables are causal to the success and failure of peace settlements. In his analysis, 
Fen Osler Hampson observes a causal relationship of the following independent variables 
to the success and failure of peace settlements: first, ripeness of conflict; second, role of a 
third party facilitator; third, the quality of a peace agreement; and fourth, the role played 
by a great power. The “role of ripeness” refers to Zartman’s condition of a “hurting 
stalemate” reached by the adversaries in the conflict. In this condition, the conflict has 
reached a point where both sides realize the futility of using force to gain unilateral 
                                                 
25 Ricardo A. David, NPS MA Thesis paper on “The Causes and Prospects of the Southern Philippines 
Secessionist Movement,” (2003), 118-119, Dudley Knox Library Bosun electronic Files 
http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/cgisirsi/Fri+Nov+18+13:57:53+PST+2005/SIRSI/0/518/0/03Dec_David.
pdf/Content/1?new_gateway_db=HYPERION (accessed 10 Jun 05). 
26 Ricardo C. Morales, NPS MA Thesis, “Perpetual Wars: The Philippine insurgencies,” (2003), 50, 
Dudley Knox Bosun files, 
http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/cgisirsi/ocBpBw5GJM/SIRSI/47190056/523/5584 (accessed 15 Jun 05). 
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advantage and thus become open to considering peace negotiations. This may also be 
caused by the deterrence effect of “a looming catastrophe” wherein the leaders fear the 
situation may deteriorate to uncontrollable and large scale violence. 27 In the case of the 
MILF conflict, the peak of the fighting in 2000 and its outcome have made the GRP and 
the MILF commit to a negotiated political settlement as the only solution to the problem. 
This realization of both sides provides the motivation to look into the conflict and find 
out if it has reached the condition of a “hurting stalemate.” Secondly, “a looming 
catastrophe” condition may be present because the major battles in 2000 may have 
revived the inclination of both ethnic groups in conflict to resort to sectarian violence that 
had occurred in the early 1970’s.  
The “role of a third party facilitator” is equally important as it serves as a crucial 
catalyst in developing supportive relationships between adversaries that may lead to de-
escalation of conflict. It helps both sides realize their ownership of the problem that 
should be solved collaboratively and no longer as a “contest to be won.”28 The third party 
can facilitate in many ways: “restructuring and sequencing issues, identifying 
alternatives, changing adversaries’ perspectives, building trust, offering incentives, or 
threatening penalties or sanctions in case of non-compliance to the agreement made.”29 In 
this regard, it is important to look into the significance of Malaysia as a facilitator and 
how committed it is in bringing about peace in Mindanao. 
Regarding the “quality of peace agreement,” it is important that the peace 
agreement covers the wide range of issues to the conflict because this will affect its 
durability.30 Hampson cited Holsti’s recommendation that “the terms of peace settlement 
must be carefully scrutinized in order to assess whether it is sufficiently comprehensive 
and sustainable to prevent, or otherwise deter new challenges that has just been 
                                                 
27 William Zartman, cited in Fen Osler Hampson, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Agreement Succeed or 
Fail (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace, 1996), 14. 
28 John Burton, cited in Hampson, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Agreement Succeed or Fail. 
(Washington DC: US Institute of Peace, 1996), 12. 
29 Fen Osler Hampson, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Agreement Succeed or Fail. (Washington DC: 
US Institute of Peace, 1996), 12. 
30 Ibid., 8-9. 
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created.”31 This makes a valid point because a badly designed peace agreement is likely 
to be a main source of failure in implementing and sustaining the terms of the accord. He, 
however, cautioned that a good peace agreement is as bad as the others if there will be 
failure in the implementation. Right now, there is no final peace agreement yet between 
the GRP and the MILF. However, the peace process is ongoing and it has reached several 
agreements already prior to reaching a comprehensive one. Hence, it is appropriate to 
look into the progress of the peace process at this stage and how likely it is that there 
would be a peace agreement. 
Lastly, the “role of a great power” is crucial to the compliance of the adversaries 
because of the incentives it can provide, the strong influence it has over the adversaries 
and its capability to pressure client states and parties in the conflict.32 The issue of 
implementation is indeed a critical phase in the history of past peace agreements with the 
Moro rebels in the case of the MNLF. The 1976 Tripoli agreement between the GRP and 
MILF failed in its implementation and the 1996 agreement is hardly a success as of this 
time. In both implementations of these agreements, there was no direct participation of a 
major power. In this regard, it is important that this study looks on the probability that a 
major power will be involved in the implementation phase of the GRP-MILF peace 
agreement and how likely will it be committed to bringing about peace in Mindanao. 
Hence, it would be interesting to look into the probability that the United States, which 
has been asked by the GRP and the MILF to participate in the peaceful resolution of the 
conflict, will assist in the implementation phase. 
Stedman saw the difficulty of ending civil wars due to the conditions of the 
implementation environment and the poor commitment of third parties to provide 
resources and troops in the post-conflict implementation phase of the agreement.33 The 
difficulty of the environment is mainly due to the spoilers who may be local or external 
actors who are not benefited in the peace settlement. Given the presence of spoilers, the 
                                                 
31 Hampson, 2. 
32 Ibid., 17. 
33 Stephen John Stedman, “ Introduction” in Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace 
Agreements, eds. Stedman, Stephen John, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (U.S.A. & U.K.: 
Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc., 2002), 2-3. 
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“implementers,” which may refer to the peace keeping force, will have to be strong and 
robust to deter them from disrupting the process. However, states will not always be 
willing to give resources and troops if such undertakings do not serve the interest of the 
participating country. 34 Commitment of third parties is driven by its personal interests. In 
most cases, it is strong when they see that the conflict is vital to its own security or may 
have some disadvantageous effect on its own country.35 This explains why Malaysia and 
the U.S have shown greater interest in assisting in the peaceful resolution of the MILF 
conflict. Along this line, this thesis paper looks at the security interest of Malaysia and 
the U.S which have shown greater interest in assisting in the peaceful resolution of the 
MILF conflict. Malaysia is a neighbor country which may have been affected in the past 
by the conflict, while the U.S. is currently engaged in the global war on terror that has 
something to do with the Mindanao conflict.  
Walter emphasizes the critical role of third parties in making adversaries in the 
conflict comply with their agreements especially on the issue of disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration of combatants because they provide the security 
guarantee that no one will be harmed and agreements will be implemented.36 Down and 
Stedman cite the critical importance of a major power’s support owing to its capability to 
support the peace track or disrupt the peace when it considers the agreement hostile to its 
interest. Certainly, major powers have the resources to spare and the military capability to 
coerce adversaries in the implementation.  
Prendergast and Plumb underscore the importance of civil society organizations in 
bringing about the peace implementation at the grassroots level, owing to its capability to 
penetrate the local communities.37 Woodward emphasizes the importance of reviving the 
economy so that people may see a peace dividend which would make them develop a 
                                                 
34 Stedman et al, 2-3. 
35 Ibid., 3. 
36 Barbara F. Walter,  “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” International Organization 51, 
no.3 (summer 1997), 340, cited from Stedman et al, 5. 
37 John Prendergast and Emily Plumb, “Building Local Capacity: From Implementation to 
Peacebuilding,” in Ending Civil War: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, eds. Stedman, Stephen 
John, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, (U.S.A. & U.K.: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc., 
2002), 327-330. 
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strong commitment to peace. She cited the importance of funds in supporting post-
conflict programs, especially demobilization and re-integration of combatants.38  
Harold H. Saunders emphasizes “the human dimension of conflict as central to 
peace making and building peaceful societies. Only governments can write peace treaties, 
but only human beings, citizens outside government, can transform conflictual 
relationships into peaceful relationships.”39 This relates to the conflict in Muslim 
Mindanao. According to Fr. Bert Layson, the issue in the Mindanao conflict is not only 
political and economic. The conflict “has something to do with the way people look at 
themselves: the way they interpret their history, religion and culture; the way they look at 
their neighbors, their officemates, their fellow farmers, their classmates and even their 
friends.”40 He cited the cases of a Muslim boy who would like to become a rebel in order 
to fight the military, and a Christian boy who would like to become a soldier in order to 
fight the rebels. “Hatred, prejudices, biases, and distrust, among others, are the little wars 
that are going on in the hearts of Muslims, Christians and indigenous people of 
Mindanao.”41 Along this line, Janice Gross Stein states that “the identities that shape 
images are not given but are socially reconstructed as interactions develop and contexts 
evolve over a trajectory of a conflict. Change in identity can reshape images, and 
changing images can provoke a reconstruction of identity.”42 Accordingly, it would help 
the peace makers to be more effective in addressing interests in civil wars by using the 
broader contexts of images and identity. Hence, it is crucial that the adversaries change 
their images of each other for a peaceful resolution to be successful.  
                                                 
38 Susan L. Woodward, “ Economic Priorities in successful Implementation,” in Ending Civil War: 
The Implementation of Peace Agreements, eds. Stedman, Stephen John, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth 
M. Cousens, (U.S.A. & U.K.: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc., 2002), 185-187. 
39 Harold H Saunders, “A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and Ethnic 
Conflicts,” (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999), Pref. xvii. 
40 Fr. Bert Layson, “Reflections on Public Participation in Peace Process in Mindanao,” 
http://www.mindanaopeaceweavers.org (accessed 28 Aug 05). 
41 Ibid.  
42 Janice Gross Stein, “Image, Identity, and the Resolution of Violent Conflict,” in Turbulent Peace: 
the Challenges of Managing International Conflict, eds. Chester A Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and 
Pamela Aall  (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press. 2003), 189. 
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According to William Zartman, there are three elements that affect the dynamics 
of conflict and govern the possibilities of a successful resolution: “the insurgents’ needs 
and the phases of rebellion, the government’s agendas, and structural relations between 
the two sides. The dynamics of each element are independent of each other; each has to 
be in the right phase for conditions to be supportive of negotiations”.43 Accordingly, 
“negotiations take place when both parties lose faith in their chances of winning and see 
an opportunity for cutting losses and achieving satisfaction through accommodation.”44 
In the case of the GRP and the MILF conflict, both adversaries have reached the hurting 
stalemate point where both realize the destructive effect of the conflict and start to look at 
opportunities in a peace process.45 
According to Donald Rothchild, in the implementation of the peace agreement, “a 
primary focus on security issues during the transition to a self enforcing peace is 
essential.”46 He cited the need for those involved in the peace process to overcome 
collective fears of the future, such as insecurity and predatory behavior of the stronger 
party in the initial transition process. In this regard, parties in the conflict would like to 
know in detail what would be the security provisions of the peace accord in the transition 
process.47 He also cited the crucial importance of the commitment of the third parties to 
provide the necessary force to effect what has been agreed upon in cases of insecurity and 
predatory behavior. In this regard, the security provision of the GRP-MILF peace 
agreement must incorporate the participation of third parties that are capable to establish 
and sustain a secured environment. 
                                                 
43 William Zartman, Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars. (Washington DC: the 
Brookings Institution, 1995), 13. 
44 Ibid., 18. 
45 USIP Special Report 131, “The Mindanao Peace Talks :Another Opportunity to Resolve the Moro 
Conflict in the Philippines,” http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr131.html#ripe (accessed 29 Aug 
05). 
46 Donald Rothchild, “Settlement Terms and Post Agreement Stability,” in Ending Civil Wars: the 
Implementation of the Peace Agreements, eds. Stephen John Stedman et al. (USA: Lynne Reiner 
Publication, 2002), 117. 
47 Ibid., 135. 
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In search for the prospect for sustainable peace between GRP and MILF, this 
thesis paper argues that positive conditions of the three independent variables or a 
combination of these variables namely: (1) ripeness of conflict for resolution, (2) the 
progress on the peace process, and (3) participation of external actors will likely result to 
the peaceful settlement of the conflict. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
This thesis is a case study of the MILF insurgency in the Philippines. It looks at 
the evolution of the conflict and its outcome, and finds out if the conflict is ripe for 
resolution. It then analyzes the conditions of the peace process to find if there are 
favorable or unfavorable conditions to the peaceful resolution of the conflict. Lastly, it 
examines the participation of external countries and international institutions, especially 
of a third party facilitator, and a major super power to find out if there is significant 
external support to the peaceful settlement of the conflict. 
This study covers the origin and incidents that led to the Moros’ armed struggle 
for secession, which includes the U.S. colonial occupation of the Philippines in the early 
20th century to the present time.  It is mostly focused on negotiating peace with the MILF, 
but because of its strong connection to the whole Moro insurgency, it also considers the 
MNLF organization. However, it does not touch on the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in 
Mindanao. Sources for this study include primary and secondary sources comprised of 
official documents, news reports, books, and scholarly literature. The analysis examined 
relevant documents and academic literature available from both the Philippines and 
international sources: a) official documents, military and police unclassified reports, 
laws, and statistics surveyed by the Philippine government and other credible institutions; 
b) international government and non-government organizations’ reports, analysis and 
statistics; c) sources affiliated or linked to the MILF and other Moro organizations; d) 
academic literature on political violence, peace building, conflict resolution and post-
conflict stabilization and reconstruction.  
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E.  ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
1. Chapter II: Evolution of the MILF Conflict   
This chapter examines the history of the conflict between the Government 
Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). It 
discusses the trends, incidents, and phases in the development of the conflict that led to 
the emergence of the MILF. It analyzes the goals, strategies and structure of the MILF, 
and the extent of its influence over the Moro people, and some current concerns. Lastly, it 
examines if the conflict is ripe for resolution by looking at the cost of the conflict and the 
opportunities that promote a peaceful resolution, rather than continuing the conflict.  
2. Chapter III: GRP-MILF Peace Process 
This chapter analyzes the prospects for the political dialogue. It looks at the (1) 
the past peace approaches of the government, (2) the peace agreements achieved so far, 
(3) the effectiveness of ceasefire mechanisms on the ground, (4) the demands of the 
MILF, (5) the political stand of the GRP, (6) the participation of civil society groups, (7) 
the obstacles and prospects of the peace process, and (8) the impact of the current 
national political crisis to the peace process. This analysis mainly covers the period when 
the peace negotiations resumed in 2001 during the time of President Gloria Macapagal 
Arroyo up to the present (2005). 
3. Chapter IV: Participation of External Actors 
This chapter analyzes the level of participation of foreign governments and 
international institutions in the peaceful settlement of the MILF conflict. It aims to find if 
there is considerable multinational involvement and if their support has a significant 
impact on the peaceful resolution of the conflict and in achieving sustainable peace. 
Substantial attention is focused on Malaysia and the U.S., who have shown the greater 
interest in the resolution of the conflict. Their direct contributions have been considered 
instrumental in aiding the GRP and MILF in bringing about a more stable security 
environment and advancing the level of the peace negotiations.  It also looks at the 
involvement of Libya, the Organization of Islamic Conference, the United Nations, and 




4. Chapter V: Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation 
Chapter V is a summary of the MILF conflict, conclusions, and recommendations 
towards achieving sustainable peace. It consolidates the positive areas on which peace 
could be achieved and at the same time recognizes the problems. It tells of the prospect 
for sustainable peace between the GRP and MILF, and emphasizes the need for greater 
involvement by third parties in the peaceful settlement of the conflict, as well as in the 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT AND ITS OUTCOME 
This chapter is an analysis of the Moro rebellion that aims to explain where the 
conflict mainly originated, how it evolved and what its outcome is.  It deals with the 
grievance issues of the Moros and the opportunities that made possible the Moro armed 
struggle. It provides crucial information on mass migration of Christian settlers and land 
policies initiated by the state that explains why land and polity become central to the 
peace negotiations of today, and the incidents that fueled the rebellion in the past. It also 
examines the MNLF and the MILF rebel groups that have launched the serious armed 
struggle for secession with the aid of external actors, which are now supporting the peace 
process. It is believed that peace with the MILF will significantly bring peace in the 
whole of Mindanao. It argues that the conflict seems ripe for resolution based on the 
outcome of the recent major clashes between the GRP forces and the MILF in 2000, 
which made them return to the peace negotiation and commit to the realization that the 
only solution to the problem is through a negotiated political solution.   
A. ORIGIN OF THE CONFLICT 
The MILF insurgency is part of the more than three decade armed struggle for 
independence by the Moros which was originally spearheaded by the Moro National 
Liberation Front in 1971. The MILF broke away from the MNLF in 1977 due to 
ideological differences and factionalism.48 It became the main rebel group, leading the 
struggle for independence in 1996, when the MNLF signed a final peace agreement with 
the Ramos government. The conflict originated from a combination of factors, but was 
largely due to the state’s migration and land policies49 that started in the early 1900s 
during the American colonial period and continued by the Philippine Republic upon its 
independence in 1946.  
                                                 
48 David, 88. 
49 Eric Gutierez and Saturnino Borras, Jr., “The Moro Conflict: Landlessness and Misdirected State 
Policies” (Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2004),  6, 
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/pdfs/PS008.pdf#search='The%20Moro%20Conflict%3A%20Land%
20and%20Misdirected%20policies' (accessed 14 Aug 05). 
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After a fierce campaign of pacification in Mindanao in the early 20th century, the 
American colonial rule initiated migration of Filipino Catholics from Luzon and Visayas 
to Mindanao through various settlement programs, which are now being blamed as major 
causes of the conflict. These settlement programs were initiated in order to first, pacify 
political military tension between the colonial state and Filipino revolutionaries in Luzon; 
second, extend the scope of nation building; and third, develop the region economically 
by infusing state and private investments.50 These settlement programs were continued 
by the Philippine government upon its independence in 1946, primarily because of the 
hukbalahap, an anti-Japanese force, which in the 1950s evolved as a peasant revolt after 
World War II due to problems of landlessness in Luzon. Members of the hukbalahap 
were offered amnesty, a house, and 25 acres of land, which eventually lured the rebels to 
return to the mainstream of society.51 
The mass migration of poor people from the north and central parts of the country 
in Mindanao created resentment among the Moros due to the devastating social 
implications it caused in their areas. These migrations have greatly impacted the 
demography of the region, whereby at the last quarter of the 20th century, the Moros have 
become the minority in their own land. The 75% Moro population in the early 1900s was 
reduced to 25% by 1960, and less than 18% in 1990.52   
  
 
                                                 
50 Gutierez and Borras, 7. 
51 Sar Desai, South East Asia: Past & Present ( US: Westview press, 2003, 5th edition), 211 -212  
52 Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, “Options in the Pursuit of Just, Comprehensive, and Stable Peace in the 
southern Philippines” Asian Survey. Vol. 41, No.2. (Mar-Apr 2001), 274.  
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53 Sourced from Gutierez and Borras, Jr., 14. 
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This settlement program of Catholics to Mindanao was supported with land 
homestead programs, which caused the Moros’ landlessness. Before colonization, the 
Muslims owned most of the land but the interplay of state’s policies on land disposition 
and migration policies slowly dispossessed the Moros of their land. The U.S. colonial 
administration implemented Land Registration Act no. 496 of 1902, which provided for 
the state’s power to issue a parcel of land to a legitimate claimant and the Philippine 
commission Act No. 178 of 1903 put all unregistered land under the category of public 
domain. The Mining Law of 1905 gave the Americans the right to acquire public lands 
for mining purposes. These were followed by the Public Land Act of 1913, 1915, and 
1925, which all provided for the availability of unoccupied, unreserved and un-
appropriated public lands to homesteaders and private corporations.54  
Filipino capitalists from the northern part of the country surged to Mindanao and 
established logging, pasture, and coconut concessions. American companies also came 
and established land based businesses. Firestone acquired 1,000 hectares for its rubber 
plantation in the Cotabato area in 1957. Dole came in 1963 and converted vast tracks of 
land into a pineapple plantation. Some obtained logging concessions, like the 
Weyerhouse Corporation which was granted 72,000 hectares of forest land in 1966, and 
the Boise-Cascade Corporation with 42,000 hectares.55  As a consequence, the 98% 
landholdings of the Moros in the early 20th century were greatly reduced to only 17% by 
the 1980s and around 80% of the Moros became landless.56 Only 30% of the land was 
left to the Moros in 1972 and by 1982, it had further declined to 17%.57 The 
disadvantaged Moros, who were not used to the concept of land property rights, lost their 
lands through dubious legal means or outright confiscation.58 Eventually, the Moros lost 
                                                 
54 Erlinda Burton, “The Quest of the Indigenous Communities in Mindanao, Philippines: Rights to 
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Philippines,” (2000), Asia Europe Dialogue (ASED), 
http://www.ased.org/artman/publish/article_333.shtml (accessed 15 Nov 05). 
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid. 
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both the political and economic powers to the Christian migrants who are now the 
majority in Mindanao. Archbishop Orlando Quevedo, President of the influential 
Catholic Bishops Conference in the Philippines, characterizes these as consequences of 
government policies towards subjugating, assimilating, and integrating the Bangsamoro 
into the mainstream body politic.59 Combined, these developments established a state of 
ethnic dominance in Mindanao, which according to Paul Collier, is a major cause for civil 
conflict in ethnically heterogeneous societies like the Philippines.60 The impact of settlers 
on the demography of the region and the growing landlessness of the Muslims 
established the grievances that would be the mobilizing forces for a potentially explosive 
situation at the right time.  
B.R. Rodil cited some of the following state’s resettlement policies: 61 
 
                                                 
59 Asian Center for the Progress of Peoples (ACPP) Backgrounder: “Working for Peace in Mindanao,”  
(May 2004), 1-2, http://www.acpp.org/uappeals/bground/mindanao.html (accessed 16 Sep 05). 
60 Collier, 155. 
61 Sourced from Gutierez and Borras, Jr., 7-8. 
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Table 2. State Resettlement Policies 
 
The infamous Jabidah massacre on 18 March 1968 on Corregidor Island, near 
Manila Bay in Luzon, topped the grievances. It served as the tipping point for the already 
huge resentment of the Moros against the government that was perceived as acting on 
behalf of the Christian majority. This unfortunate incident stemmed from President 
Ferdinand E. Marcos’ plan to retake Sabah from Malaysia on behalf of the ownership 
claim by the sultan of Sulu. The secret plan was to infiltrate Sabah and instigate a 
rebellion among the Tausogs against the Malaysian government, whereupon the 
Philippine military would later intervene to protect the rebels.62 As part of this plan, the 
AFP recruited 200 Muslims in Mindanao, mostly Tausog and Samal young men from 
Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, who underwent training in Corregidor. However, these recruits 
were involved in a mutiny, which resulted in the death of fourteen Muslim recruits and 
seventeen others missing.63 The Moros’ outrage was compounded by the fact that no one 
from the military was indicted.64  The outcry of their sentiments is captured best by 
Buendia when he said,  
                                                 
62 Norodin Alonto Lucman, “Moro archives: A History of Armed Conflicts in Mindanao and East 
Asia” (Quezon City: FLC PressInc., 2000) , 155, cited from David, 61. 
63 David , 62. 
64 Buendia, 3. 
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The Jabidah mass execution inflamed Christians and Muslims alike and 
stoked up the extant revolutionary environment in late 1960s to early 
1970s. Filipino Muslims have experienced the contradictions in their 
hyphenated identity and felt the frustrations in their bid to be integrated 
into the body politic. The massacre was perceived as state’s assault against 
Muslims who offered their services to the Republic, but were duped, 
subjugated, and perfidiously murdered by Christians acting on behalf of 
the state.65 
The incident brought the Muslim resentment to its peak and led to the formation 
of the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) by former Cotabato governor, Datu 
Udtog Matalam, who vowed to establish an independent state in Mindanao, the Sulu and 
Palawan.66  The independence movement gained support from Libya which even opened 
an Islamic directorate of the Philippines to coordinate its assistance to the Moros.67 
Similarly, Malaysia, feeling aggrieved by the plan of Marcos to retake Sabah, extended 
guerilla training support to the young members of the MIM in Sabah, starting in 1969.68 
Those who underwent training in Malaysia included Nur Misuari who eventually formed 
the MNLF upon return to Mindanao.  
In central Mindanao, sectarian violence between Christian settlers and Muslims 
spread like wildfire in the early 1970s. Christian gangs attacked Muslims as Muslim 
gangs also attacked Christian farmers resulting in the deaths of 137 people in the span of 
two months. The sectarian attacks escalated further and proved devastating. From the 
period between January and October 1971, 305 Muslims and 269 Christians were killed 
and approximately 500 houses were burned.69 This period also saw the rise of Christian 
Tiruray resistance in Cotabato led by Feliciano Luces, popularly known as Kumander 
Toothpick, who became known as a fanatical anti-Muslim, fighting armed Moro gangs 
and elites. The most gruesome evidence of the sectarian violence was the Manili incident 
                                                 
65 Ibid. 
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175, cited from Tan, 272. 
67 Tan, 272. 
68 Ibid. 
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wherein an armed Christian group in Cotabato known as Ilaga massacred sixty-five men, 
women and children at a mosque in June 1971.70  
B. RISE AND DECLINE OF THE MNLF 
The Moro National Liberation Front emerged in 1969 and spearheaded the armed 
struggle for the secession of Mindanao, which saw the height of the fighting in the early 
1970s, but was unsuccessful. It signed a peace agreement with the Philippine government 
in 1976, which was a failure, and another one in 1996, which is considered to be holding 
as of now, but is hardly seen as a success up to this time.  The MNLF was formed when 
Datu Udtog Matalam, founder of the MIM, abandoned his call for independence after he 
was offered the position of Presidential Adviser on Muslim Affairs in October 1968, 
representing the four million Muslims of the country.71 In effect, the MIM was dissolved 
but this did not put aside the strong sentiment for secession among the young Filipino-
Muslim members of the MIM. Nur Misuari, who was then a charismatic university 
professor, was quick to mobilize this sentiment and the Muslims’ resentment against the 
Christian migrants in Mindanao. He successfully formed the Moro National Liberation 
Front (MNLF) in 1971. The MNLF immediately gained international recognition from 
the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM), the Organization of Islamic 
Countries (OIC), and was particularly supported by Libya and Malaysia.72  
Following this, the period from 1972 to 1976 saw the fierce battles between the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the MNLF, resulting in the deaths of 
approximately 100,000 people and more than 500,000 displaced refugees.73 At the height 
of its counter insurgency campaign from 1972 to 1976, the military deployed 50 
battalions for the battles to retake Jolo and Cotabato.74 The cost of human lives and 
destruction of property prompted the Marcos government to negotiate a peaceful 
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settlement through mediation by the OIC and Libya. This led to the 1976 Tripoli 
agreement that provided for the merger of thirteen provinces that were then clustered as 
part of regions nine and ten, into one autonomous Bangsamoro regional government.75  
However, the peace agreement did not provide a viable solution to the conflict.  
Differences on how the autonomous government should be created became a major 
obstacle to peace. On the one hand, Marcos argued that the creation of the autonomous 
government should be in accordance with the constitutional process, that is, by involving 
the people in the affected areas through the conduct of a referendum. On the other hand, 
Misuari opposed Marcos’ call for a referendum and insisted on the immediate declaration 
of a unitary autonomous government.76 He realized that the Moros did not have the 
numbers to win in a referendum because Christians were already the majority at that 
time. True enough, the result of the referendum on 17 April 1977 overwhelmingly 
rejected the MNLF’s aspiration for one autonomous region to which the thirteen 
provinces should belong.77  It also rejected some aspects of the autonomy, such as 
adapting the name Bangsamoro Islamic Region, flying a separate flag, Sharia courts, and 
allowing the MNLF to be the regional security forces.78 Based on these results, there was 
no way the Moros would be able to exercise political power over the numerically, 
economically, and politically superior Christian settlers.79 Misuari felt cheated and 
accused the government of violating the provisions of the 1976 Tripoli agreement. The 
situation further deteriorated when both sides started to accuse each other of ceasefire 
violations. In the 8th Islamic Countries’ Foreign Ministers Meeting (ICFM), Misuari tried 
to pressure Marcos by asking the OIC to impose economic sanctions on the Philippines, 
but failed.   
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The outcome of the peace agreement was a failure. However, the conflict in the 
period from 1976 to 1996 did not have the same intensity as in the early 1970’s. This can 
be attributed to the reduction of external support and internal developments that 
weakened the MNLF. Marcos’ diplomacy with Libya and the OIC largely reduced the 
support of the MNLF. This was coupled with the defeat of Tun Mustapha, a major 
external supporter of the MNLF in the state of Sabah. Internally, the MNLF also suffered 
from the defection of many of its leaders to the government and the break away of 
Hashim Salamat’s group in 1977.80  Thus, the MNLF armed struggle significantly waned 
and Mindanao was relatively more peaceful than during the early 1970s. However, the 
conflict remained open ended with the GRP and MNLF waiting for the right time to start 
anew on the negotiations for settlement of the conflict. 
Twenty years later, the MNLF forged a final peace agreement with the GRP under 
the term of President Fidel V. Ramos in 1996.  He pursued peace negotiations with 
various rebel groups, placing special importance on ending the Moro insurgency in the 
south. Ramos’ peace efforts were supported by Indonesian President Suharto and the 
OIC. Indonesia played a mediating role in the peace process, while the OIC continuously 
influenced the MNLF to settle the conflict with the Philippine government. Hence, the 
MNLF had no choice but to settle for autonomy.81  
The peace agreement provided for the creation of the Southern Philippines 
Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), which was responsible for the 
implementation and supervision of peace and development programs in Mindanao’s 
Special Zones for Peace and Development (SZOPAD). SZOPAD covered fourteen 
provinces and nine cities in Mindanao, including Palawan.82 Under the agreement, the 
existing Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM-this was created during the 
presidency of Corazon Aquino, Ramos’ predecessor) was to be re-engineered into a 
wider autonomous regional government subject to referendum in the affected areas.  
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Nine days after the peace agreement, Nur Misuari ran unopposed for the position 
of governor in the existing ARMM.  The government backing made him the most 
influential leader in Mindanao as he was Chairman of the SPCPD and Governor of the 
ARMM at the same time. Other MNLF commanders also assumed positions in 
government, such as in the local municipalities, provincial government, regional 
assembly and in the bureaucracies of SPCPD and ARMM. In addition, some 5,200 
MNLF members were integrated in the AFP and 1,250 in the Philippine National Police 
(PNP).83 The MILF distanced itself from GRP-MNLF peace negotiations despite 
invitations from the government because of its consistent preference to independence 
rather than mere autonomy.   
The relationship soured between the GRP and Misuari five years after the peace 
agreement, during President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s term. People from within and 
outside the MNLF organization accused Misuari of incompetence and corruption. For a 
period of five years under his leadership since 1996, some PhP 43 billion was allocated 
by the national government for the region’s development programs, but this yielded no 
major improvement.84 This was further complicated by Misuari’s opposition to the 
conduct of a referendum in August 2001 for the expansion of the ARMM, as outlined in 
the 1996 peace agreement. A new ARMM was to replace the old one and the SPCPD, in 
which Misuari was serving as governor and chairman respectively. This was to be 
followed by an election scheduled on 26 November 2001 for the new ARMM officials, 
which posed as a threat to Misuari’s political positions at the time. His woes continued 
when the MNLF’s “Council of Fifteen” seized control of the MNLF and stripped him of 
his powers as chairman of the MNLF by reducing his position to chairman emeritus. The 
council of fifteen was later given recognition by the Philippine government and the OIC 
as the ruling body of the MNLF.85 Thus, feeling betrayed and fearful of losing his 
powers, Misuari instigated his loyal followers from his native place of Sulu to attack 
several military posts in the area on 19 November 2001. The attack left around 100 
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people dead that were mostly his followers.86 When Misuari fled to Malaysia, he was 
detained by Malaysian authorities and was subsequently turned over to the Philippine 
government. He is currently in confinement awaiting trial for sedition and corruption.87  
C.  THE MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT  
Fractionalization in the MNLF central committee along ethno-religious lines and 
the ideological differences between Misuari and Salamat led to the emergence of the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).88 In 1977, Salamat Hashim led a break-away 
group composed mainly of fighters from central Mindanao. They were mostly 
Maguindanaoans, Maranaos and Iranuns.89 Different from Nur Misuari, Salamat was a 
religious scholar who studied at Al Ahzar University in Egypt. His personality was more 
moderate and reconciliatory at the beginning of his leadership.90 He died on 13 July 03 in 
a remote area in the southern Philippines due to a natural sickness.91 
1. Goals 
The goal of the MILF is to establish a sovereign Islamic state which shall be 
governed by Shariah law in areas of Mindanao where the Moros are the majority.92  This 
goal indicates two political aspirations of the rebel group: firstly, independence from the 
Philippine republic by separating a portion of the country’s territory, and secondly 
establishing a polity that is religious in character.   
At the outset of its separation from the MNLF in 1977, the MILF enjoyed the 
support of key Moro personalities, such as former Senator Salipada Pendatun, ex- 
Representative Rashid Lucman,93 and several Muslim religious leaders.94  Misuari was 
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successful in the late 1960s to propagate and capitalize on the un-subjugated identity of 
the Moros in mobilizing the Filipino Muslims against the Philippine republic.95  Salamat 
Hashim, on the other hand, used Islam as the rallying point for the Moros, which proved 
to be a powerful means of mobilizing support for the armed struggle because of the 
Moros’religious character.  
It should be noted that, in the 1980s, there was a resurgence of religious and 
cultural Islamic practice, as a consequence of the Muslims’ program to revive Islam 
worldwide. Religious scholars and funds flowed from Middle East countries and 
Malaysia for the revival of Islam, reflected in the number of mosques mushrooming from 
mere hundreds in the 1970s to 1,500 by 1983.  Also, there were more than 3,000 religious 
preachers and   more Madrasah schools being established, numbering  2,000 in 1998.96 
2. Strategies 
Since its formation in 1980, the MILF showed a more moderate and conciliatory 
stance than the MNLF. Seemingly, it was their strategy to avoid major clashes with 
government troops so that its forces could be built up.  By the late 1990s, the group was 
able to reach an estimated strength of 8,000 to 11,000 men, organized into six (6) 
divisions of the Bangsamoro Islamic Army (BIAF).97 The MILF maintains its mass base  
support from central Mindanao’s 1.6 million Maguindanaoans and 1.9 million Maranaos 
from Lanao del Sur, and Iranuns from north Cotabato and Basilan.98 This large base 
demonstrates the wide influence of the MILF among the Moro people.99 The MILF has 
effective control of large areas of central Mindanao from which it draws an 80 member 
Consultative Assembly that has popular Moro support.100 The bulk of MILF forces are in 
the provinces of Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, and North Cotabato 
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where the Maranaos and Maguindanaoans are majority.101 Apparently, Basilan, Sulu and 
Tawi-Tawi provinces remain under the influence of the MNLF. This explains why the 
fighting in the year 2000 between the government forces and the MILF only took place in 
the central Mindanao areas and not in the three aforementioned provinces controlled by 
the MNLF. 
Aside from establishing a local support base, the MILF maintains contact with 
external supporters, particularly from members of the worldwide ummah community. In 
the past, training, equipment and funding of the MILF were provided by a host of 
supporters mainly from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, and Malaysia.102 The OIC and 
Libya, however, do not openly support the MILF because of its continuing recognition of 
the MNLF as the representative of the Moros.103 By reason of geographic proximity and 
the tacit support of Malaysia, Sabah served as a vital training ground for the MILF 
leaders wherein ex-British Special Forces even took part in conducting the training.104  
3. MILF Structure and Capabilities  
The MILF organization has evolved from a simple break-away armed group in 
1977 to the politico-military organization that it is today. The MILF has an executive 
council that determines policies and their implementation, chaired by Al Haj Murad 
Ebrahim. It also has its supreme Islamic court as its judiciary branch that handles 
criminal and civil cases in accordance with shariah law. Its legislative branch is called 
Majilis al-Shura. The MILF’s military wing is the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Force 
(BIAF), which used to be organized into six territorial divisions, and is now organized  
into nine base commands with more or less six brigades each  and a separate special 
operations group.105  
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In 1996, the MILF gained more members after the signing of the peace agreement 
between the GRP and the MNLF with membership reaching as high as 15,000,106 and 
since then became the primary vanguard of the Moros’ struggle for independence. “A 
Philippine military intelligence estimate in January 2005 puts the MILF strength from 
11,000 to 12,000 people, with 9,000 firearms, more or less; however, western intelligence 
puts it at 15,000 people with 11,000 firearms, more or less.”107 Although the MILF is not 
at par with the Armed Forces of the Philippines in terms of military equipment, it has a 
huge arsenal of weapons that, aside from the normal AK47, M16, and M14 rifles, 
includes Russian made RPG-2 rocket propelled grenade launchers, mortars, machine-
guns and allegedly a US-made Stinger anti-aircraft missile.108   
4. Present Challenges to the MILF Leadership 
The major offensives launched against the MILF in the year 2000, the death of 
Hashim Salamat, and the presence of the terrorist groups in Mindanao threaten the 
cohesiveness of the MILF organization and its public image.  Currently, it is facing three  
challenges of weak command and control, factionalism, and its reported ties with the 
terrorist groups.  
5. Weak Command and Control 
The aftermath of the AFP major offensives in the year 2000 caused the six big 
MILF territorial divisions to disperse into smaller formations in order to avoid easy 
detection and to have more flexibility to conduct hit and run tactics against the military 
forces. However, the MILF’s shift to guerilla tactics caused the transformation of six 
MILF territorial divisions into nine mobile base commands.109 An outcome of this is that 
the field commanders enjoyed much autonomy in coping with situations on the ground. 
The top leadership has loosened its firm grip over those rebels in the field. Definitely, 
there is less MILF control of its field units now than before the AFP offensive in 2000.110 
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6. Factionalism in the MILF 
The death of Hashim Salamat on 13 July 05 exposed the latent tension between 
two main ethno-linguistic groups within the organization. MILF Maguindanaoans 
objected to the appointment made by the dying leader for Alim Abdulaziz Mimbantas to 
become the next leader of the MILF.111 Mimbantas, who was also a graduate of Al Azhar 
University in Egypt, was the vice chairman for internal affairs under which he led the 
internal security force, the local intelligence network, and the internal brigade.112  
The objection of the Maguindanaons also stemmed from the fact that Mimbantas 
is a Maranao and that he does not have the propensity of force that the Maguindanaon Al 
Haj Murad has. While Murad is supported by more than 5,000 armed followers, 
Mimbantas has only a few hundred followers. This issue of succession took the MILF 
more than three weeks to settle before it was able to officially announce the death of 
Hashim Salamat.113 Evidence of factionalism is seen in limiting the powers of 
Mimbantas, Murad’s main rival to the chairmanship position of the MILF, and in 
appointing officials to key positions of the organization based on ethnic bias. The 
position given to Mimbantas as vice chairman for military affairs was not concurrent as 
the chief of staff of the BIAF, which used to be held at the same time by Al Haj Murad in 
the past.114 Instead, a fellow Maguindanaoan was given the position as chief of staff of 
the BIAF in the person of Sammy Al Mansour, a trusted aide of Murad.115  
This gives a glimpse of the ethnic friction between Maguindanaoans and 
Maranaos who largely comprise the MILF rank and file. Although a power struggle may 
have been settled now that Mimbantas voluntarily gave way for Murad to assume the 
MILF leadership,116it is something that may likely explode in the future, owing to the 
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differences and brewing competition between the two ethnic groups, if not carefully 
harmonized. This problem of ethno-linguistic division is not new among the Moro rebel 
groups. In fact, the MILF broke away from the MNLF in 1977, not only due to 
differences of ideology, but also because of differences among the top leadership along 
ethno-linguistic lines.117  Thus, at this early stage, the MILF organization must be very 
keen to maintain the political harmony of the two main ethnic tribes that provide the 
backbone of the organization. 
7. MILF’s Link with Terrorist Groups 
The most serious challenge to the MILF leadership is the reported link of the 
rebels with terrorist groups, particularly with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), that existed during 
the time of the late Salamat Hashim as chairman of the MILF. Allegedly, training is 
being continued at the lower levels of the organization. Accordingly, a JI training camp 
named Camp Hudaibiyah was established within Camp Abubakar As Siddiq,a MILF 
main camp, in 1994.118 That same year, the first batch of trainees trained for two months 
and consisted of 60 MILF recruits and the next batch followed in 1995. Known JI 
terrorists that have been involved in Rizal day bombings in Manila, Davao airport, and 
Bali and Jakarta (GRP embassy) in Indonesia had reportedly been in the place between 
1996 and 1999, either as instructors or students.119 
Fathur Rohman Al Ghozi, a confessed Rizal day bomber in Manila, was assisted 
by an MILF member named Mukhlis Yunos when he carried out the Rizal day bombing 
in Manila in December 2000. Mukhlis was the company commander of the BIAF special 
operations group detailed with the 3rd Field division under Alim Solaiman Pangalian, and 
was believed to be carrying the call for Jihad of Hashim Salamat in view of the fall of 
Camp Abubakar in July 2000.120 
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In February, 2003, Salamat called again for all Moros to rise and fight for Jihad in 
retaliation to the AFPs Buliok offensive.  As a result, several bombings occurred in 
Kabacan, Cotabato airport, Koronadal, Davao city airport, Tagum and Tacurong.121 
These bombings were mostly executed by another graduate of Camp Hudaibiyah named 
Zulkifli who was assisted by his cohorts and local MILF as confessed by Abdulbasit 
Usman, an MILF platoon commander at the time.122 These bombings clearly show the 
terrorist’s support for the MILF, if not the direct connection. On 20 June 2003, in view of 
the peace talks and the mounting pressure from both the US and Philippine government, 
Salamat Hashim issued a statement renouncing terrorism.123  Officially, the MILF 
distanced itself from the terrorist group. However, it is uncertain if Salamat’s 
pronouncement is being observed by the local commanders on ground that used to have 
connections with the JI operatives since 1994.  
Today, the MILF leadership has renounced time and time again its reported ties 
with terrorist groups and insisted that the MILF is a legitimate armed struggle for 
independence. MILF chairman Al Haj Murad Ebrahim said in May 2005, “The MILF is 
very much opposed to any form of terrorism and this is incompatible with the MILF 
vision for the economic, cultural, and political advancement of the Bangsamoro 
people.”124   
D.   A CONFLICT RIPE FOR RESOLUTION? 
After more than three decades of armed violence that saw its peak in the year 
2000, the conflict seems ripe for resolution. A mutually hurting stalemate condition 
between the Philippine government and the MILF lends ripeness to the conflict as well as 
the emergence of opportunities and necessities. Zartman explains that a mutually hurting 
stalemate refers to a condition wherein the adversaries of the conflict have perceived that 
there is no longer any unilateral advantage to be gained in continuing the fighting, and 
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instead see more costs in staying in the fight. In such situations, a peaceful settlement of 
the conflict becomes attractive as a way to avoid a potential catastrophe.125   
The government and the MILF have been badly hurt by decades of fighting which 
has already resulted in huge amount of both direct and indirect costs. Experts estimate the 
cost of the three decade conflict in Mindanao at roughly $2 - $3 billion dollars with 
120,000 deaths and millions of migrants. It also contributed to the alarming widespread 
poverty of the populace in the ARMM which accounts for 56 % in 1991, 62.5% in 1997, 
and 71.3 % in the year 2000.126 The Moro provinces ranked poorly among 78 provinces 
of the country.  This only shows the negative effects of the conflict in the economy. 
Definitely, there is no actual winner in the 2000 peak of the fighting. Both sides prefer 
the peace process now than to continue the fighting because they are hurt by its huge 
cost. In the four months of fighting in the year 2000, the Philippine government spent 
around U.S. $ 20 million and suffered 200 casualties. 127 For its part, the MILF lost 
several hundreds of its fighters, destruction of 50 of its camps including the biggest ones: 
camp Abu Bakar and camp Bushra, and the dispersal of its semi-conventional force into 
smaller units.128  
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Table 3. Comparison of Human Development Index Ranking and Real Per Capital 
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Table 4. Worst-Performing Provinces Based on HDI Rank and Other 




Learning from the outcome of the armed violence in 2000, the GRP and MILF are 
unlikely to embark in a protracted war anew. On the side of the MILF, the fighting is too 
costly because the rebels’ communities have become the battlegrounds and this creates 
far reaching traumatic effects on their families. Proof of the MILF’s seriousness to the 
peaceful option rather than continuing the fight is by its insistence to involve the 
international community in the peace process. In doing so, it puts forward its 
commitment to resolve the conflict peacefully in the eyes of the international community. 
Furthermore, the MILF’s priority on the issue of security and rehabilitation of the Moro 
affected communities as the two main agenda in the peace negotiation shows its concern 
for the communities rather than continuing the fight. It only means, that the MILF is hurt 
when the Moro communities are affected by the fighting. Moreover, the MILF severed its 
ties with the JI terrorists in mid 2003 in view of the U.S. and the GRP’s demand for the 
MILF to renounce terrorism. Definitely, the MILF does not want to continue the fight and 
become an object of the war on terror. For its part, the GRP has always insulated the 
MILF from the war on terror, especially in the height of bombings in 2003. It prevailed 
upon the U.S. not to include the MILF in the list of foreign terrorists organization, and 
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instead merely stepped up the pressure towards the MILF to renounce terrorism.131 This 
only shows of the GRP’s strong commitment to pursue the peace track with the MILF 
than continuing the fight. The Philippine government could have sent the military again 
to attack the MILF positions and maximize aid from the U.S. war on terror had it opted to 
declare the MILF as a terrorist organization. By declaring the MILF as a terrorist group, 
the GRP will lose its chance to settle the conflict peacefully. It will find its place locked 
in armed hostilities once again, which is something the GRP would not want to happen 
because continuing the fight will only escalate the hostilities and may force the MILF to 
strengthen ties with extremists groups.132Furthermore, the presence of a looming 
catastrophe, according to Zartman, enhances the ripeness of the conflict argument since 
the Philippine government and the MILF would not allow it to happen because the people 
in the communities would definitely suffer in large scale violence. As discussed earlier in 
this chapter, the sectarian violence between Christians and Muslims in the 1970s, which 
claimed several hundreds of lives and destroyed several hundreds of houses in just a 
period of one year may likely re-occur and escalate into an ethno-religious catastrophe. In 
fact, during the resumption of violence in May 2003, a majority Christian municipality in 
Zamboanga del Norte, Siocon town, was attacked by the Moro rebels killing at least 20 
Christian soldiers and civilians, and held a dozen more hostages, as the rebels fled.133 
Attacks on Christians by the Moro rebels tend to re-ignite the age old animosities 
between them. In Carmen, Cotabato, several mixed communities started to seek 
protection among ethno-religious groups. Moros from majority Christian communities 
moved to villages that are dominated by their fellow Muslims just like in the cases of 
Malapag, Aroman, Manarapan, and Kitulaan villages, while Christians from Kitulaan 
moved to Christian dominated areas of Aroman and Carmen town.134 These incidents are 
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closely associated with the conflict that tends to surface every time there is renewed 
fighting between the government forces and the rebels. Thus, if the conflict continues in 
the future there is a high probability that sectarian violence may resurface and deteriorate 
into a catastrophic magnitude. 
In addition, ripeness of the conflict is enhanced by conditions of necessity and 
opportunity that are currently relevant. The Philippine government recognizes the fact 
that the conflict has been a major stumbling block to developing the country’s economy, 
and the only way out is through peaceful settlement of the conflict.  Likewise, it is a 
necessity to end the conflict in view of the government’s fight against terror, knowing the 
fact that a peaceful settlement of the conflict will have a negative impact on Islamic 
militancy in the region. Furthermore, there are also certain opportunities that add ripeness 
to the conflict: the death of Salamat Hashim provides the new leadership with more 
flexibility in seeking out fresh solutions; the MILF’s willingness to discuss its interests 
ahead of the political arrangement provides for a wider range of options rather than 
limiting the talks to the “independence or autonomy” proposition that hindered peace 
talks in the past, since the MILF has shown cooperation in a more interest based and 
problem solving negotiations. Lastly, the conflict has attracted international attention and 
participation that enhances its prospects for resolution.135 
E. CONCLUSION 
There is a good prospect for achieving sustainable peace with the MILF because 
the conflict seems to be ripe for resolution and there are existing opportunities that favor 
its peaceful resolution. The outcome of the three decade conflict between the GRP and 
the MILF has seemingly reached the condition of a mutually hurting stalemate wherein 
both sides see the futility of continuing the conflict due to loss of life, property, and 
economic impact. 136 This is evidenced by the fact that both sides have re-affirmed in the 
2001 Tripoli agreement that the only solution to the conflict is a negotiated political 
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settlement, and by their decision to allow the participation of the international community 
in finding a solution to the conflict. This is a realization that they cannot achieve victory 
over the other and that the best way is to resolve the conflict through the peace 
negotiations. Furthermore, both sides are sensitive to the welfare of the people in the 
affected areas as shown by their intention to prioritize the agenda of security and 
rehabilitation. The military may have the advantage of training, weapons and equipment, 
but it is not at all invincible to guerilla attacks by the rebels. On the side of the MILF, 
continuing the armed struggle is no longer favorable because it would result in more 
deaths and destruction on their side, especially since their communities have always been 
the battle grounds.  
 In the year 2000, the MILF was also been badly weakened by the outcome of the 
major offensive by the military. This made the rebels realize that they cannot win over 
the superior strength of the military and the only option left for them is peaceful 
negotiation. The MILF rebels are also forced to stay in the peace negotiation and cut their 
ties completely from the terrorists JI and Abu Sayyaf by the U.S. and Philippines war on 
terror. The death of Hashim Salamat also opened possibilities for the new leader, Murad 
Ebrahim, to explore other solutions. Murad is not a religious leader, so he may entertain 
more flexibility, unlike Salamat who had been restrictively consistent for establishing an 
independent Islamic state.  The more than three decade old conflict has deeply submerged 
the areas of the Moros into widespread poverty. This condition provides an opportunity to 
attract the rebels into the peaceful resolution of the conflict by offering substantial peace 
and development programs because this would increase the incentive for peace.   
The unfair state’s migration and land policies in the past have mainly caused the 
political and economic marginalization of the Moros that, in effect, engendered a 
perception of exploitation and prejudice among them.  Along this line, the land issue 
remains a critical point in resolving the conflict. Regaining significant control of land 
resources in Mindanao will reduce significantly the Moros’ perception of past injustices. 
Having included for the first time the ancestral domain issue as one of the major agenda 
in the ongoing peace process gives a bright prospect to the peaceful settlement of the 
conflict.  
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The old animosity between Christians and the Moros seems to have been revived 
by the fighting in 2000 and 2003, as people in the affected areas divide among ethno-
religious groups for protection. This condition shows a potentially dangerous situation 
because people start to identify the other ethnic group as hostile to their group, and vice 
versa.  It can become similar to the incidents of early 1970s when sectarian violence 
erupted between Christians and Muslims. However, it also shows that such condition 
only happen every time the fighting between the military and the rebels would occur, and 
drag people in the communities to take sides. Hence, the level of mistrust between the 
two ethnic groups is largely connected to the armed violence that happens in their 
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III. GRP-MILF PEACE PROCESS 
The prospects for sustainable peace between the GRP and the MILF largely 
depend on the success of the peace process and the surrounding political environment 
that may or may not be helpful to the whole peace effort.  This chapter analyzes the 
prospect of the political dialogue. It looks at the: (a) past peace approaches of the 
government, (b) the peace agreements achieved so far, (c) the effectiveness of ceasefire 
mechanisms on the ground, (d) the demands of the MILF, (e) the political stand of the 
GRP, (f) the participation of civil society groups, (g) the impact of the current national 
political crisis to the peace process, and (h) the obstacles and prospects of the peace 
process. It is encouraging that the ceasefire is holding and the peace process has 
successfully hurdled the first two substantive agenda of security and rehabilitation, and 
there was a recent breakthrough on the last agenda of ancestral domain, which would 
then lead the peace process in negotiating for the political solution of the conflict. The 
political condition in the country has also opened a window of opportunity to 
accommodate a Bangsamoro state due to the current move to shift the country into a 
parliamentary federal republic. Based on this development, the MILF will have the 
chance to exercise a wider political and economic power in the new polity.  
A. PAST PEACE APPROACHES WITH THE MILF  
Several attempts for peace were made in the past by previous administrations of 
the Philippine government, but none has reached a peaceful settlement with the MILF. 
Military campaigns only resulted in more violence and destruction, trapping the innocent 
civilians in this seemingly endless conflict. President Ramos initiated peace negotiations 
in 1997 which bore some headway but fell short to consolidate his gains due to his 
retirement in 1998. President Estrada used a coercive approach and declared a total war 
with the rebel group in 2000, but failed to end the conflict. President Arroyo, the 
incumbent, opted for the peace negotiations to solve the conflict, which has been going 
on since 2001, and is now the object of this study.   
The Philippine government never had formal peace negotiations with the MILF in 
the past because it was cautious not to give the MILF a belligerent status. It is also due to 
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the fact that the Philippine government and the OIC have considered the MNLF as the 
recognized representative of the Moro people. Hence, Philippine approaches to peace 
were always directed at dealing with the MNLF.  It was only during the term of President 
Ramos that serious peace efforts with the MILF were first initiated.137 Following the 
peace agreement with the MNLF in 1996, the Ramos government initiated talks with the 
MILF leadership about conducting peace negotiations. Exploratory talks from October 
1996 to January 1997 resulted in the formation of a GRP-MILF technical committee 
which was divided into two parts: one for cessation of hostilities and the other for the 
peace talks and agenda setting. This was followed by the presentation of the MILF’s 
talking points and nine point agenda in February 1997.138 The major breakthrough of the 
Ramos initiative was the “Agreement for the General Cessation of Hostilities” (AGCH) 
in 1997.139 The AGCH also provided for establishing GRP-MILF Coordinating 
Committees for the cessation of Hostilities (CCCH), having six members each.140 
Although there were occasional but small firefights between the military and the MILF 
rebels in the peripheries at that time, the governments’ peace initiative pushed on and the 
ceasefire agreement was upheld.  
Under the Estrada administration (1998-2001), the government sought to advance 
the level of the peace negotiations by tackling the substantive agenda issues. However, it 
is during his term that the peace efforts would make a one hundred eighty degree turn to a 
totally warlike approach that would later result in large number of casualties on both 
sides, massive destruction of property, and a huge number of refugees. 
In August 1998 under the Estrada administration, the negotiation with the MILF 
continued and both panels arrived at the General Framework of Agreement of Intent 
(GFAI) with the MILF. Serious in its efforts, the GRP has acknowledged seven major 
camps of the MILF by October 1999 and was verifying 39 other camps which were then 
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scheduled to be completed by the end of December of the same year.141 However, the 
acknowledgement of each camp as MILF’s territory set an incentive to expand further its 
areas of control. For the MILF, establishing control of certain municipalities, then asking 
for GRP’s recognition of these areas as its territories, will mean more territories. This 
modus operandi later led to the escalation of the hostilities. In the year 2000, the military 
eventually clashed with the MILF rebels when they forcibly occupied Kauswagan town 
hall in Lanao del Norte on 16 March 2000. This led to the breakdown of the ceasefire and 
the escalation of violence.142 The military forcibly undertook actions to retake the town 
hall, and eventually conducted major offensives against the MILF’s several 
encampments. The heavy fighting caused great loss in human lives and property on both 
sides, with civilians caught in the crossfire. 143   
Between 1996 and early 2000 before hostilities began, several agreements have 
been reached including joint communiqués, acknowledgments, and resolutions, which 
totaled all in all to 39. Sixteen of these agreements were provisions for the 
implementation of the ceasefire, which involves creation of the ceasefire committees, 
technical working groups, deployment and repositioning of troops and other safety and 
security agreements. Other agreements deal with the framework of the talks (13), on 
procedural matters (6), and on verification and recognition of MILF camps (4). However, 
there was no resolution made on the substantive issues brought out by the MILF.144   
The on and off characteristics of the peace negotiations between the GRP and 
MILF during the period was due to the lack of sincerity on both sides to resolve the 
conflict. This was because both sides were strictly tied to their respective interests that  
restricted the peace talks’ progress. On the one hand, the GRP is hard bent on insisting 
that the conflict will be resolved within the context of the Philippine constitution. On the 
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other hand, the MILF will not compromise the issue of independence.145 Thus, the 
condition was a major confrontation waiting to happen, which eventually exploded in the 
year 2000.  
Noticeably, there are two factors that were absent during the peace initiatives of 
the GRP from 1996 to 2000 that may have contributed to the failure of the peace talks. 
One is the absence of a third party participation in the peace process. A third party 
facilitator or mediator could have guided the two adversaries in a more peaceful 
collaborative dialogue. It should be noted that the success of GRP-MNLF was largely 
credited to the active participation of Indonesia and the OIC. The other one is the absence 
of major battles between the military and the MILF prior to 2000.  Major confrontation is 
also important because the high cost of human lives and property and other forms of 
hardship create a traumatic effect that makes the resumption of fighting more unlikely. 
Besides, the major battles largely weakened the MILF. These two factors that are present 
today, in the term of President Arroyo, create better opportunities to resolve the conflict. 
When President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo became President in 2001 after 
President Estrada was ousted by a civil-military protest over allegations of corruption, 
she immediately offered a ceasefire and invited the MILF rebels to the peace 
negotiations. Her efforts brought into the picture some external actors like Malaysia and 
Libya, which were responsible in facilitating the 2001 agreement in Tripoli that outlines 
the substance of the peace negotiations.  
B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON PEACE AGREEMENTS 
Since the resumption of the peace talks in 2001, there have been several 
agreements achieved by the GRP-MILF negotiating panels. These agreements were 
crucial to the cessation of hostilities on the ground and in simplifying the framework 
agenda from the nine point agenda raised by the MILF before the escalation of hostilities 
in the year 2000. However, it was in the middle part of 2003 when these agreements 
started to show stabilizing effects and progress to implementation because of the 
resumption of hostilities in February 2003, which disrupted the peace talks for three 
months. Nevertheless, the peace negotiations have continued and have now reached a 
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breakthrough on how to tackle the most complicated ancestral domain agenda. There is 
now a good prospect that a comprehensive final peace agreement will be reached by the 
middle of the year 2006. 
The importance of these peace agreements characterize Oulett’s definition of 
peace agreements as those “intended to end a violent conflict, or at least transform that 
conflict in a significant way into one that is approached more constructively.”146 These 
agreements are a combination of (1) pre-negotiation agreements that deal with cessation 
of hostilities and confidence building measures; agreements on (2) framework or 
substantive issues, which address the wide scope of issues concerning the conflict’s root 
causes, consequences and the commitment to resolve the problems peacefully; and (3) the 
implementation agreements, which puts in detail agreements on how the substantive 
issues will be implemented.147  
President Arroyo’s peace initiatives resulted in the resumption of the peace talks 
between the GRP and the MILF, which was formalized on June 22, 2001 in Tripoli, 
Libya, wherein both parties reaffirmed the “Agreement for the General Cessation of 
Hostilities” and the “General Framework of the Agreement of Intent” signed by both 
parties in July 18, 1997 and  August 27, 1998 respectively. Both the GRP and MILF 
committed to a “negotiated political settlement of the Bangsamoro problem,” and to an 
enduring peace and stability in Mindanao in which Malaysia was recognized as a third 
party facilitator. Most importantly, the agreement has outlined the three substantive 
agenda of security, rehabilitation, and ancestral domain, much more simplified and 
workable issues than those nine agenda presented by the MILF in the past.148   
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Since then, several implementing agreements were agreed upon. A joint 
communiqué issued on August 7, 2001 stated an agreement for the implementation of 
guidelines to cease hostilities.  This was signed by President Arroyo in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia and the invitation was extended to both local and international monitoring 
teams to oversee the cessation of hostilities. On May 6, 2002, both parties agreed to 
jointly contend with criminal syndicates and lost commands operating in Mindanao 
through the creation of the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group.  This group would be composed 
of representatives from both parties and would coordinate actions against the criminal 
syndicates. This was followed by an agreement on implementing guidelines of the 
humanitarian, rehabilitative, and developmental aspects on May 7, 2002.149 
However, the peace process was disrupted because of the kidnapping-for-ransom 
group, particularly the Pentagon gang, which was believed to be hiding in MILF 
territories. On February 11, 2003, the AFP launched a battalion size combat operation in 
the Buliok complex in Pikit North Cotabato in the interest of capturing criminal elements 
in the area. However, the AFP’s intention was regarded as doubtful considering the 
Buliok complex was the new headquarters of the MILF after the fall of Camp Abubakar 
in 2000. Hence, it was viewed as a direct attack against the MILF and a firefight ensued 
between the AFP and MILF forces. As a result, Salamat Hashim called for Jihad in the 
wake of the offensive, which was immediately followed by a series of six bombings in 
Mindanao (Kabacan, Cotabato city, Koronadal, Davao city, Tagum and Tacurong) in four 
weeks.150  Strong suspicions for such bombings were directed towards the MILF’s link 
with terrorists, especially the Davao airport bombing, which killed twenty-two people. 
These were followed by large attacks of MILF members on municipalities of Maigo, 
Lanao del Norte, Siocon, and Zamboanga del Norte that killed dozen of civilians.  
In view of these attacks, the government responded strongly. Arroyo ordered air 
and artillery attacks against terrorist cells embedded in the MILF areas and called on the 
MILF leadership to renounce terror or suffer the consequence of being designated as a 
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terrorist group on the list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTO).151 Despite the interlude 
of violence and accusation on both sides, the peace initiative was able to survive through 
a series of back channeling and exploratory talks in Kuala Lumpur.152 On 28 March 
2003, both the GRP and the MILF issued a joint statement for their commitment to 
achieve a comprehensive, just, and lasting political settlement of the conflict; mutual 
restraint to minimize violence; and activation of the Bangsamoro Development Agency 
(BDA),  which would normalize the situation and implement other confidence building 
measures.153   
Currently, the GRP-MILF peace negotiations have successfully hurdled the pre- 
negotiation phase (cessation of hostilities) and have made gains on the substantive issues 
of security, rehabilitation, and ancestral domain,154 but they have yet to tackle the 
negotiated political settlement. In this case, the solution may be creating a wider 
autonomous local government for the Moros, creating a Moro state under a Parliamentary 
Federalist Philippines, or granting independence to the Moros in areas where they are the 
majority.155  
The security agenda provides for the progressive resolution of the Bangsamoro 
problem with honor, justice and integrity for all sectors of the society. It also allows for 
wider participation of the Bangsamoro people in the peaceful resolution of the conflict 
through consultations. Unlike past negotiations, the parties expressed their invitation for 
the OIC to observe the implementation of the GRP-MILF agreements. The parties have 
also committed themselves to strengthen the agreement on the general cessation of 
hostilities in which they have authorized the deployment of an international monitoring 
team that will be constituted with members of the OIC.156 In line with this, the following 
actions have been undertaken: formation of the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG) on 
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September 6, 2003, purposely against criminal elements, wherein a total of five teams 
were put in place covering fifteen provinces in Mindanao; formation of the local 
monitoring teams as a support mechanism for ceasefire implementation; completion of 
the phased re-deployment program of AFP troops from Buliok complex; dropping of 
charges against MILF leaders and members who had been initially implicated in the 
Davao bombings; and the deployment of a 60 man international monitoring team (IMT), 
composed of representatives from Malaysia and Brunei Darusallam with three Libyan 
monitors on October 2004.157 
The rehabilitation agenda provides for the adherence to the international 
humanitarian law, protection of evacuees and displaced persons, and ensures their 
fundamental right to self determination. Furthermore, the MILF was also given the 
authority and responsibility to undertake and manage the rehabilitation of the affected 
areas. However, in cases where government funds are used, the government rules and 
procedures take precedence. Thirdly, the parties guarantee not only the safe and orderly 
return of the evacuees from their respective places of origins but will provide resources or 
reparations in order to start anew. Moreover, the rehabilitation aspect emphasizes the 
importance of the cessation of hostilities as a major building block towards the successful 
return of the refugees and normalization of their lives.158 So far, some of the concrete 
gains on the rehabilitation agenda include the following: establishment of a Multi Donor 
Trust Fund (MDTF) through the World Bank in 7 October 2003; conduct of MDTF Joint 
Needs Assessment in selected areas of 13 provinces affected by the conflict; and the 
formation of the Bangsamoro Development Authority, which is intended to undertake the 
rehabilitation and development programs in the conflict affected areas.159 
Lastly, the agreement emphasizes the importance of resolving the aspect of the 
ancestral domain agenda, which refers to the issue of ancestral land that the Bangsamoro 
people claim as traditionally and communally owned. This was the hardest to tackle 
among the talking points because the issue infringes on property rights law. Identifying 
                                                 




and getting back those lands identified by the MILF as Bangsamoro’s ancestral land from 
the landowners (by virtue of land titles in their names) is certainly problematic and 
complex. Hence, it was left unresolved during the 2001 Tripoli agreement of peace and it 
was agreed to discuss the details later.160 There was not much progress on this agenda 
because both panels made the security and rehabilitation issues take priority. The 
negotiating panel saw the need to put up more mechanisms on ground to ensure that the 
ceasefire is being observed in the field and prevent incidents that may drag the military 
and the MILF rebels to renewed hostilities, similar to what happened in early 2003 when 
the peace talks were disrupted because of large scale military operations against a 
criminal syndicate in the MILF area. In September 2005, the GRP-MILF negotiating 
panel scored a major breakthrough on the contentious issue of ancestral domain in their 
round of talks in Malaysia. The two panels have successfully arrived at an agreement on 
how to approach the issue of ancestral domain. Along this line, Secretary Afable, chief 
government negotiator, has announced that an ancestral domain agreement is likely to be 
reached in December and that the prospects of a final peace agreement are high in mid 
2006.161  
C. PEACE MECHANISMS ON THE GROUND 
The Ceasefire Committee on Cessation of Hostilities, the International Monitoring 
Team, the Local Monitoring Teams and the Ad Hoc Joint Action Groups are all peace 
mechanisms on the ground that ensure the success of the ceasefire in the field. They have 
proven very effective in preventing ceasefire violations and preventing incidents of 
armed encounters from escalating. The members of the GRP-MILF peace panels play a 
very significant role in the peace process because they address the issues and negotiate 
several agreements. However, the peace panels can only advance the level of talks if the 
ceasefire agreement is being observed and implemented by both adversaries on the 
ground. Instances in the past have shown a big gap between the progress on the 
negotiating table and the behavior of the forces in the field. For example, the attack on 
                                                 
160 “GRP-MILF Signed Agreements.” 
161 Government of the Philippines, “Mindanao Peace Talks moving faster, peace agreement seen early 
next year,” relief Web, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/MIRA-6GG5LL?OpenDocument 
(accessed 03 Oct 05). 
 52
the rebels’ camp in the Buliok complex that disrupted the ceasefire in early 2003 
(between the GRP and MILF) was launched by the military at the time when government 
peace negotiators were about to present a draft of the peace agreement with the 
MILF.162 Similarly, the MILF field units have committed ceasefire violations in the 
past. Currently, this gap is being addressed carefully by these aforementioned peace 
mechanisms that oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agreement through 
coordination, monitoring and fact finding missions.  
The Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH), with 
representatives from both parties, acts as the overall body that addresses all the issues 
regarding the ceasefire and incidents of violations. Its effort is supported by the 
International Monitoring Teams (IMT), composed mainly of members of the Malaysian 
Armed Forces with a few from Libya and Brunei Darrusallam. The participation of the 
IMT strengthens both the GRP and MILF commitment to peace because it provides 
neutral observation of the condition and incidents of violation in the area. Local 
Monitoring Teams (LMT) were also established on identified hotspots areas. These 
LMTs conduct active ceasefire awareness programs to develop local support, aside from 
doing on scene investigations of reported violations. These are composed of five 
representatives from each group with the participation of local NGOs. The last, but not 
the least, is the GRP-MILF Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), which serves as a 
coordinating body against criminal elements. AHJAG ensures that mis-encounters 
between government forces and the MILF rebels are avoided when pursuing the criminal 
elements in Mindanao.163  
The effectiveness of these peace mechanisms is shown by the fact that the 
conditions on the ground have already normalized and are now relatively more stable 
than two years ago.  Records show that from January 1 to July 18, 2003, there were 528 
ceasefire violations. Suddenly, incidents of violations declined to only 31 from July to 
December 2003. Likewise, the whole year of 2004 from January to December saw a 
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decline to only about 70, without serious armed confrontation.164 This stabilizing effect 
of the peace mechanisms also proved effective in preventing serious violation from 
escalating into large scale hostilities. In January 10, 2005, about 100 MILF guerrillas 
under Abdul Rahman Binago simultaneously attacked army detachments in Linantangan, 
Mamasapano and Labo-Labo in Sharif Aguak, both in Maguindanao, which left eight (8) 
soldiers and thirteen (13) MILF rebels dead. The ceasefire monitors immediately 
informed the military and MILF leadership to act decisively on the incident, which 
prevented the fighting from escalating.165 In the succeeding investigation, the Ceasefire 
Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities found the local MILF leader guilty of the 
ceasefire violation. It was learned that the attack was a personal decision of the local 
MILF commander that was carried out to avenge the recent death of his criminal brother 
in an encounter with government troops. In this regard, the MILF leadership deactivated 
its 105th rebel guerilla base command for six months starting in April, and indefinitely 
suspended two deputy commanders involved in the attack, who are also reportedly 
having collusion with JI terrorists.166 Since then, no serious violations have occurred to 
this date.  
D.  THE MILF’S DEMANDS 
Going into the peace negotiations and affirming to accept a negotiated political 
solution seems to indicate the MILF’s readiness to compromise on the issue of 
independence, but this is not yet the case. Inspired by East Timor in 2000, the MILF’s 
pronouncement to accept a negotiated political settlement has been obscured by its 
insistence to hold a UN sponsored referendum for independence in areas where the 
Muslims are the majority.167 Considering the MILF’s demands from the start of the peace 
negotiations in 1997, it remained consistent from the very beginning. 
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At its initial peace negotiation with the GRP in 1997 during the time of President 
Ramos, the MILF presented a single talking point referred to as “the solution to the 
Bangsamoro problem” which involved various social, cultural, political and economic 
issues but are not limited to the following:  
1. ancestral domain;  
2. displaced and landless Bangsamoro;  
3. destruction of properties and war victims;  
4.  human rights issues;  
5.  social and cultural discrimination;  
6.  corruption of the mind and the moral fiber; 
7.  economic inequities and widespread poverty; 
8.  exploitation of natural resources;  
9.  agrarian reform.168 
Finding a lasting political solution to these issues and concerns form the core of 
the MILF agenda with the end view being to “establish a system of life and governance 
suitable and acceptable to the Bangsamoro people.”169 On June 14, 2000, the MILF 
recommended the following solutions to the Bangsamoro problem:  
1. recognition of the Bangsamoro as a distinct people and nation;  
2. restitution of the ancestral domain to the Bangsamoro people; 
3. reparation of damages caused by injuries to life, liberty and property; 
4. exclusive control of the Bangsamoro people over their national governance, 
security and national resources; 
5. identification, investigation, and prosecution of persons for war crimes and 
violations of human rights before an international tribunal for war crimes; 
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6. pronouncement of a public apology by the GRP to the Bangsamoro people for 
the crimes and harm caused by their subjugation, oppression and 
exploitation.170 
Santos points out the MILF’s use of the word “system,” which does not directly 
refer to independence, but rather shows flexibility to accommodate a political solution so 
long as it is acceptable to the Bangsamoro people. On the contrary, the message of these 
demands was very clear that the MILF wanted a territory, which refers to its claims of 
ancestral domain and a sovereign government of its own, by citing exclusive control of 
governance, security, and national resources. It was in no way compromising the issue of 
independence, especially at the time when they were poised to challenge government 
sovereignty in the year 2000, inspired by the success of East Timor. In fact, in an 
interview with Crescent International in 1999, the late Chairman Salamat Hashim 
emphasized the MILF’s demand for nothing less than independence in areas of Mindanao 
where the Moros are the majority, which was consistent to the MILF’s end goal of 
establishing a separate Islamic state in Mindanao.171 Clearly, independence was the 
position held by the MILF when it pulled out of the peace process during an escalation of 
violence with government forces in June 2000. Bishop Quevedo also cited several 
pronouncements that Salamat made as reasons for new hopes for peace.  These are his 
renunciation of terrorism, his realization that the historical circumstances restricting the 
Bangsamoro people cannot be overturned, and his declaration that the final solution to the 
conflict is by way of political settlement.172 However, these pronouncements do not 
directly mean the MILF is giving up its quest for independence, although it guarantees 
the MILF’s interest in peaceful negotiations.  
Today, it seems the new chairman, Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, is echoing mixed 
messages. In a recent interview, he said that the MILF is ready to sign "a negotiated 
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political solution that is just, lasting and comprehensive in order to terminate the age-old 
conflict in Mindanao." However, he also said in a different pronouncement that the MILF 
would never compromise the right of the Bangsamoro people to self-determination, 
referring to independence.173 In several pronouncements, the MILF has ruled out any 
possibility for autonomy as a political option in view of the MNLF 1976 and 1996 peace 
agreement’s failure to deliver peace and development in the region.174 However, it 
seems silent to the idea of a Bangsamoro state under a parliamentary federal republic of 
the Philippines. Between two extreme issues of autonomy and independence, a Moro 
state in a federal government seems to be a likely compromise and a win-win solution 
rather than going back to the war path.   
Presumably, the MILF will still vie for the same thing, a referendum for 
independence, when the formal peace negotiations begin in 2006. However, there is also 
a big possibility that the MILF will settle for something less than independence due to the 
incentives of peace and the fact that it has been weakened by the year 2000 major 
military offensive, and because independence has no support from the international 
community as discussed in chapter IV. Nonetheless, the MILF commitment to work on a 
negotiated political settlement is yet to be seen during the actual negotiation, if it will 
compromise or not on its demand for independence.  
E. THE GOVERNMENT’S POSITION 
Based on past negotiations with Moro rebels, the GRP always limits its solution 
within the bounds of the republic’s constitution; specifically its adherence to protect the 
national territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state that is well expressed in the 1987 
constitution.175 This being the case, it rules out the possibility of yielding to the MILF’s 
demand for independence and only allows provisions for autonomy in dealing with 
secessionist struggles, as in the cases of the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) 
and MNLF who were both given autonomy in the past. In fact, the rushed proposed draft 
offered to the MILF, in time for President Bush’s visit to the country in 2002, by the GRP 
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was a “meaningful autonomous government,” which is actually an expanded version of 
the existing autonomous region for Muslim Mindanao.176 However, based on the recent 
political developments in the country, the Philippines is seeing a shift to a parliamentary 
federal system of government. This development opens a window of opportunity for the 
Moros to be accommodated in a distinct Bangsamoro state. So far, it is the most visible 
political option of the government for the MILF, although its official stance is yet to be 
seen in the formal peace negotiations.   
F. CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS 
Prendergast and Plumb underscore the capability of the civil society organizations 
in supporting the implementation of peace agreements towards sustainable peace for two 
reasons: firstly, they have the capability to bridge conflictual communities, and secondly, 
they can serve as a pressure group to political leaders to remain working toward the 
peaceful negotiation of the conflict.177   In relation to this, Santos sees the presence of 
peace advocates in Mindanao as one of the brightest hopes for the Mindanao peace 
process. Networking for peace became an advocacy for seriously concerned groups to 
support the process through a coalition known as Mindanaw Peaceweavers. The coalition 
includes the Agung Network, Bishops-Ulama Forum (BUF), Consortium of Bangsamoro 
Civil Society (CBCS), Mindanao Peace Advocates Conference (MPAC), Mindanao 
Peoples Caucus (MPC), Mindanao People’s Peace Movement (MPPM), Mindanao 
Solidarity Network (MSN), and Peace Advocates Zamboanga (PAZ).178  
In the affected areas, they have been involved in one way or another in promoting 
a culture of peace through education, research, relief and rehabilitation of evacuees, 
interfaith dialogue, reconciliation and healing, and other initiatives. These groups are 
bridging the gap between the larger communities in conflict and addressing animosities 
between Christians and Muslims in Mindanao. They also exerted their influence on 
political leaders to continue the peace talks in 2003. In fact, the success of the ceasefire 
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between the GRP and MILF, that is holding up to now, can be largely credited to the 
MPC initiated grassroots led “Bantay Ceasefire” (Ceasefire Watch). So far, it has done a 
great support to the local monitoring teams by conducting inspections and field 
investigations of reported violations.179  
Among these civil society organizations, the participation of the Bishop-Ulama 
conference provides the greatest hope for bridging the two ethnic communities in conflict 
based on the religious character of both Christian and Muslim Filipinos. Despite decades 
of conflict, the religious institutions in Mindanao remain an influential sector with a wide 
network of churches and mosques in almost every village where people go to pray and 
listen to their religious leaders. The BUC has shown active participation in the peaceful 
resolution of the conflict, particularly in the year 2000 when it called on the government 
and the MILF to go back to the negotiating table and clarified that the conflict is not a 
religious war,180 thus preventing the occurrence of sectarian violence between Christians 
and Muslims.  Undoubtedly, reconciliation can take off at the village level through the 
active support and administration of the religious leaders.  
G. THE CURRENT POLITICAL CRISIS 
The ongoing political crisis in the Philippines that threatens President Arroyo’s 
position brings both positive and negative effects to the peace process with the MILF. On 
the one hand, in the event of more serious political instability in the future leading to a 
possible ouster of President Arroyo, the peace negotiations and its gains may be 
jeopardized and discontinued by the succeeding regime. The crisis also casts doubts on 
the viability of the government to enter into a peace agreement with the MILF, given the 
uncertainty of continuity brought about by the political crisis. On the other hand, the 
crisis has opened a greater window of opportunity to amend the constitution, wherein the 
Presidential unitary system will be changed to a parliamentary federal system of 
government. In effect, this increases the prospect of a Bangsamoro state where the Moros 
could exercise a high degree of self-determination. In the meantime, everything is 
                                                 
179 Santos Jr., 40-41. 
180 Bishop Antonio Ledesma, “A ten point Program for Peace in Mindanao (Perspective from the 
Bishops-Ulama Forum),” http://www.philsol.nl/A00a/Bishop-Ulama-Program-may00.htm (accessed 08 Oct 
05). 
 59
dependent on how the political crisis will develop. Hence, it is noteworthy to examine the 
crisis. 
The political crisis stemmed from allegations of electoral fraud against President 
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, who was declared the winner by almost a million vote margin 
over her closest rival Fernando Poe Jr. in the May 2004 Presidential elections.   
Accusations of fraud by the opposition party didn’t get much public attention until one 
year after, when a wiretapped conversation, between President Arroyo and Virgillo 
Garcillano, was exposed to the public in June 2005.181 This was indicative of 
manipulation, since Garcillano was a ranking official of the commission on election, and 
the conversation allegedly occurred during the election period.  Allegedly, the 2004 
national election was rigged in favor of the President and her political allies.182 The tape 
created a public outrage and prompted several calls for President Arroyo to resign. On 
June 27, three weeks after the tape was exposed and played by the media, the President 
denied the allegations of electoral fraud over the national television broadcast. However, 
she admitted it was her voice on tape. This admission dragged down the President’s 
popularity rating. Public opinion surveys conducted by the Social Weather Station (SWS) 
in Manila showed her rating of trust reduced to 17 %, and 59 % viewed her actions as 
cheating.183 A similar survey conducted by Pulse Asia Survey showed 69 % lost trust in 
the President.  
Political opponents spearheaded by the United Opposition (UNO), a coalition of 
political parties composed mainly of former Estrada and Fernando. Poe, Jr. (now 
deceased) supporters184 further intensified protests for the President’s resignation. 
Several other universities and colleges joined the GMA resign-movement, including the 
prominent De la Salle University, which even paid a daily newspaper for a full page ad. 
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This was followed by a serious blow from her own government on July 8, 2005 when ten 
members of her  cabinet filed their irrevocable resignation and asked President Arroyo to 
resign, citing the issue of “leadership and credibility” by the President to lead the Filipino 
people.185 This was followed by similar calls for resignation from the senate President, 
Franklin Drilon, the influential Makati Business Club, and former President Corazon 
Aquino.  
Four months after, the political situation remains volatile due to the persistence of 
street protests and also because of the continuing rift between the Senate and the 
Executive Department over issues of inquiries being conducted by the senate. One 
example is the inquiry on the controversial venable contract,186 in which the National 
Security Affairs Secretary Norberto Gonzales was ordered to be detained by senators for 
not cooperating with the senate inquiry by not answering simple and direct questions.187 
Irked by the Senate’s grilling of Gonzales, President Arroyo accused the senators of using 
the inquiries “in aid of destabilization” and not “in aid of legislation.” She issued 
executive order 464, an order barring high government officials to attend senate inquiries 
without her approval. The senators responded by asking the Supreme Court to junk EO 
464.188  
Despite the intensity of protests and maneuverings by her political opponents, the 
President remains in power due to two powerful institutions in the country and the 
support of her political allies in the House of Representatives.  The church and the 
military, which have always been very crucial in the nation’s history of removing 
controversial Presidents through people power in the past (like the cases of former 
President Marcos in 1986 and Estrada in 2001), did not support widespread calls for the 
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President to resign.  In an official statement, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the 
Philippines (CBCP) called for the restoration of moral values in Philippine politics, but 
did not ask the President to resign and instead, prayerfully supported her to find a 
solution to the crisis.189 The military, on its part, maintained its political neutrality. The 
Chief of Staff declared “the military will not intervene in the political developments and 
instead continue to provide security and protect the democratic process.”190 So far, both 
the church and the military have been sufficient support groups for President Arroyo’s 
cling to power.  Moreover, the President also enjoys the support of her political allies in 
the House of Representatives. In fact, the impeachment complaint against her did not 
progress in Congress because of lack of support from the representatives. Based on the 
Philippine constitution, an impeachment complaint shall have the endorsement of one-
third of the members of the House of Representatives, which the opposition failed to 
muster.191 Seemingly, calls for her resignation have been tempered also by the 
President’s decision to hasten the constitutional amendment to shift the system of 
government into a parliamentary federal republic.  
The move to change the constitution towards a parliamentary federalist 
government is gaining support from prominent political personalities and institutions. 
Former President Ramos and the incumbent speaker of the House of Representatives Jose 
De Venecia, who both belong to the ruling Lakas Christian-Muslim Democrats (CMD) 
political party are in the forefront in support to the charter change. In fact, during the 
height of persistent calls for President Arroyo to resign, Ramos was the one who 
recommended charter change as the best alternative to the political condition of the 
country, and the crisis as well.192 His support for President Arroyo during the height of 
the political crisis and his charter change solution seemed influential to scale down calls 
for President Arroyo to resign. This only shows that the former President still commands 
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a high level of influence in the country. At the House of Representatives, speaker de 
Venecia and his allies are working fast on a house resolution that will amend the present 
constitution. He also endorses a team of about 100 civil society leaders and Charter 
reform advocates from the "Coalition of Citizens for Charter Change Now!" in making 
dialogue and consultations with the people nationwide.193 The Union of Local 
Association of the Philippines (ULAP) and the League of Provinces in the Philippines 
(LPP) also support the charter change. These groups are composed of local officials in 
the country, such as governors and mayors of provinces and municipalities respectively.  
In fact, these local officials support the call for a review within 2-3 months of the 1987 
Charter by Congress as a Constituent Assembly.194 Another strong proponent for the shift 
to the parliamentary federal system is the Citizen’s Movement for Federalism in the 
Philippines (CMFP), headed by Jose V. Abueva.  
Abueva argues for the need to change to a parliamentary federalist system of 
government, citing several good reasons that will eventually solve the country’s political 
woes. He cited that the ruling class has exercised political power through a highly 
centralized unitary system of government based in “Imperial Manila,” which has the local 
governments acting similarly to colonial states except for having the influence on 
votes.195 He argues that the lack of good governance under the unitary-Presidential 
system in the current Philippine style of democracy has aggravated the Filipinos’ 
condition while benefiting the ruling elite.196Similarly, Hutchcroft and Rocamora cited 
the Philippine democracy’s deficit in uplifting the lives of the Filipinos in which 
hegemonic elite dominate the electoral process in particularistic politics rather than 
programmatic ones. They argue for the need to reform democratic structures and build 
stronger political systems that would make democracy more responsive to the citizenry in 
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general.197 So far, CMFP has the most detailed vision of a parliamentary federal 
Philippines, which incorporates Bangsamoro as the tenth state.”198According to its draft, 
the states will gain vast powers of governance, particularly regarding security and 
economic aspects needed for development,199 while the federal state will be mainly about 
national and international concerns for security, justice and economy.200 Abueva cited the 
Bangsamoro state for the Moros in Mindanao as one of the top priorities in a five to ten 
year implementation of the parliamentary federal shift.  
In the past, amending the constitution for the shift to a parliamentary federal 
republic was met with suspicion by the people because of their poor trust in the 
politicians, regardless of its relevance. However, the issue of charter change has gained a 
brighter prospect today due to less suspicion and the growing need for it based on two 
political crises that have occurred in recent times.  The idea of a charter change was first 
broached by former President Fidel V. Ramos in 1997. However, this did not materialize 
due to lack of support from influential people. Some sectors doubted his intention and 
viewed it as a ploy to perpetuate himself in power, since his  term was about to end in 
1998. No less than former President Corazon Aquino and Jaime Cardinal Sin, two 
influential people at the time, spearheaded large demonstrations against charter change 
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along with their followers, making the issue very unpopular then.201 However, the 
political crisis that followed the term of President Ramos seemed to justify the necessity 
of a shift to a parliamentary federalist state. The ouster of President Estrada in January 
2001, through the peoples’ power, proved so divisive that the political condition of the 
country still suffers, even to this day. Had there been a parliamentary system, the crisis 
would have been addressed in the parliament through a “vote of no confidence,” without 
the political cost of instability. Up to this day, the way President Estrada was removed 
from power is a rich source of debate as to the issue of its constitutionality. Such a 
condition is again evidenced by the present political crisis being faced by President 
Arroyo over the issue of alleged cheating in the May 2004 elections.  The issue tends to 
drag the public again into chaotic street protests, which is by all means unhealthy to the 
political and economic condition of the country. Thus, the shift is likely to gain more 
support now than in the past because Ramos is no longer in power, and in view of the 
Estrada experience and the current political crisis.  
H. OBSTACLES AND PROSPECTS OF THE PEACE PROCESS 
The greatest obstacle to the peaceful resolution of the conflict is the MILF’s 
demand for independence, which clashes with the constitutional provision on the 
“territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state,” which is the primary responsibility of 
the Armed Forces of the Philippines.202 As the primary sovereign law of the land, any 
amendment to it shall be subject to the approval of the Filipino people through a 
referendum nationwide, which makes it an exercise in futility for the Moros, owing to the 
vast majority of non-Muslim citizens in the country. Nevertheless, since the MILF has 
committed, along with the GRP, that the only way to resolve the conflict is through a 
negotiated political solution, there is a good chance that it may accept a solution other 
than independence. Furthermore, the independence issue does not stand on legal grounds 
in comparison with the case of East Timor, which the MILF derives inspiration since 
2000. The Mindanao and Sulu archipelago were integrated under the 1935 constitution 
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before the Philippine independence in 1946. In the case of East Timor, it was not part of 
Indonesia when Sukarno declared independence against the Dutch in 1945. It remained 
under the Portuguese administration until 1974. When the Portuguese left, East Timor 
was forcibly annexed by Indonesia in 1976.203  Hence, the UN sponsored referendum in 
East Timor was a case of a decolonization process that provides for the Timorese right to 
self-determination.204 Moreover, the MILF may loosen its stand for independence 
because it does not have international support even from Muslim countries which used to 
be its supporters in the past. Leading countries and inter-governmental institutions like 
U.S., Malaysia, Libya, and the OIC maintain their support for the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of the Philippine republic as discussed in chapter IV. They recognize that the 
Bangsamoro problem can be resolved within the bounds of the Philippine constitution. In 
fact, the OIC still maintains its official recognition of the MNLF as the vanguard of the 
Bangsamoro people and not the MILF. This was further affirmed by Libyan President 
Muammar Al Qadhafi in the signing of the Tripoli agreement in June 2001 when he said 
that “Muslims in the Philippines can achieve peace and development only within the 
framework of the Republic of the Philippines and its constitutional guarantee of justice, 
equality, and mutual respect, of tolerance, of freedom from oppression, and freedom from 
discrimination.”205  
Furthermore, the Philippine state will not allow the separation of any part of 
Mindanao because of its geographic and economic significance to the country’s viability. 
It is an all too important region having 1/3 of the country’s total land area and 22% of the 
population. It was generating as much as 20% of the country’s GDP by 1970, not to 
mention the vast mineral resources that have not been explored for economic benefits.206 
In 1996, it accounted for 25% of rice production; 67% of cattle and tuna, and more than 
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50% of the corn, fish, chicken, and pork requirement of the whole country; 100% of 
pineapple, rubber, and banana exports; 90% of plywood, veneer and lumber; 63% of 
nickel reserves; 48.3 % of gold reserves; 38.5 % of forest area; and 38 % of farm land of 
the Philippines.207   
Another obstacle is the disparity of understanding on the aspect of ancestral 
domain between the GRP and the MILF. On one hand, the government bases its 
perspective of ancestral domain from the 1997 Indigenous Peoples’ Republic Act 
wherein it guarantees the right of the minority groups to claim collective ownership of 
their ancestral land but does not relieve the state of its power of eminent domain. On the 
other hand, the MILF sees it as exclusive control for territory and economic purposes.208  
Furthermore, retaking the land from private registered owners, be they Christians or 
Muslims, is highly complicated, which if not handled carefully may result in more harm 
than good.  It is also not clear if the MILF will also claim individual land properties 
owned by fellow Moros. Based on government records, the Moros have not filed their 
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADCs) in the past. Most of those who filed are 
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The current national political crisis poses a threat to the peace process and the 
goal of achieving sustainable peace. A case of another leadership change will obviously 
delay the peace negotiations and the agreements that have been initially made might be 
subject to scrutiny by a new administration. It is important that the peace process does not 
lose its momentum and will continue to head towards forging a final peace agreement.   
Also, there is lack of support from the influential elites in Mindanao for the peace 
process. They seem to have a bystander attitude and are not supportive, if not directly 
opposed. These include provincial and municipal leaders such as “Lobregats of 
Zamboanga City, the Antoninos of General Santos city, Governor Daisy Avance Fuentes 
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of South Cotabato, Governor Manny Pinol of North Cotabato, and Mayor Rodrigo 
Duterte of Davao City.” 211  Since the bulk of the problem is a land issue in which the 
MILF is claiming restitution of land within the context of ancestral domain, these 
political leaders will, more likely, clash over not granting concessions on behalf of their 
Christian Bisayan constituents.212  
Lastly, the presence of spoilers within the ranks of the MILF, who allegedly 
maintain an alliance with JI and the Abu Sayyaf Group in Mindanao, pose a threat to the 
peace process. Stedman and Rothchild define spoilers as leaders or factions who use 
violence to undermine the implementation of agreements.213 These rebels can sabotage 
the peace talks by committing violations of the ceasefire agreements and supporting 
terrorist activities of JI and the ASG, which may drag the MILF and government forces 
into an escalation of armed violence. In fact, a major violation of the ceasefire happened 
in January 2005 when a faction of some 100 MILF rebels attacked Army detachments in 
Linantangan, Mamasapano and Labo-Labo in Sharif Aguak, both in Maguindanao, 
leaving 8 government soldiers and 13 MILF rebels killed.214  
The recent announcement of the peace negotiating panel, in resolving the most 
contentious issue of ancestral domain (the last of the remaining substantive agenda), 
creates hope for the continuing progress of the peace process. In principle, the MILF has 
agreed to share the economic benefits derived from the ancestral lands, similar to the 
concept of royalty fees. Both panels are expected to resolve the issue for a political 
solution before the year ends, followed by the formal peace process early next year. As 
announced by the chief government negotiator, Secretary Afable, a final peace agreement 
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may be signed by mid-year 2006.215 Likewise, due to the hardworking and competent 
members of the Ceasefire Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities, the International 
Monitoring team, the Local Monitoring team and the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group, the 
ceasefire is holding and the peace process is advancing. The resulting secured 
environment makes it conducive for the peace panels to negotiate for the political 
solution to the problem. It should be noted that in the past, ceasefires and peace 
negotiations were disrupted by incidents on ground that were not properly addressed 
locally, which even resulted in the escalation of violence in 2000 and the disruption of the 
ceasefire in 2003. Indeed, these peace mechanisms have been very effective, as shown by 
the large decline of reported ceasefire violations in the latter part of 2003, the whole of 
2004, and in the year 2005.  
The commitment of the MILF leadership in the peace negotiations seems to be 
holding as the MILF’s central committee handed down disciplinary punishment to erring 
members. It deactivated its 105th rebel guerilla base command for six months, starting in 
April, and indefinitely suspended two of its deputy commanders over allegations of 
collusion with JI terrorists. The same base command was also involved in a ceasefire 
violation in January 2005, leaving a total of 27 soldiers and rebels dead.216  
Despite the political crisis, the Philippine government, under President Arroyo, 
remains strong and capable to negotiate peace with the MILF. Likewise, the move for a 
charter change brings hope to what could be a negotiated political settlement with the 
MILF in the future. Considering the two options of independence and autonomy at the 
extreme ends, accommodation of the Moros into a separate Bangsamoro state under a 
federalist Philippines may well be a good compromise. A Bangsamoro state offers more 
political powers to the Moros and less control from the federal government. In this way 
the Moros can exercise their sense of self-determination.  
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I. CONCLUSION 
Based on the progress of the peace negotiations and the continuing success of the 
ceasefire on the ground, it is likely that a peace agreement will be signed between the 
GRP and the MILF in 2006. This can be gleaned from the fact that both parties have 
successfully addressed the three substantive agenda of security, rehabilitation, and the 
recent breakthrough on the ancestral domain issue, which provides for a good condition 
leading to the negotiation on the possible political solution. The probability of arriving at 
a peace agreement is further reinforced by the current political trend that provides for the 
good opportunity to amend the constitution which, in effect, would pave the way for a 
better alternative political solution than the clashing issues of autonomy and 
independence. In this regard, a Bangsamoro state under a federalist Philippines becomes 
a viable option, and may be a good compromise between competing positions of 
autonomy and independence, given the fact that the MILF has committed to a negotiated 
political settlement as the only solution to the conflict.  
Apparently, there is a growing participation of the civil society organizations 
which also enhances the chances for a final peace agreement between the GRP and the 
MILF. These organizations have so far been involved in the peace process and have 
shown their significant importance in pressuring both sides to remain on the peace track. 
More importantly, these institutions can significantly help in further developing popular 
support for the peace process. These groups composed of both Christians, Muslims and 
the indigenous people of Mindanao, can work in a variety of ways to bring the peace 
agenda to the people at all levels, particularly the local politicians in the area who may 
have been opposed to granting concessions with the Moros. A pro-active civil society can 
definitely help popularize the peace process and sustain the level of intensity to resolve 
the conflict. These civil society organizations are likely to participate aggressively 
because these are located in Mindanao, whose members and communities are oftentimes 
victims of the fighting between GRP forces and the MILF. Being on the field has made 




IV. EXTERNAL ACTORS 
This chapter looks at the participation of external actors and examines their 
commitment and significance to bringing about sustainable peace between the GRP and 
MILF. So far, multinational involvement in the conflict’s peaceful settlement includes 
Malaysia, U.S., Libya, the OIC, the U.N., and the World Bank.  The support of these 
countries and institutions enhances legitimacy to the peaceful solution and the viability of 
its success. Apparently, there is a good prospect for peace with the MILF due to the 
support of the aforementioned actors. 
A.  MALAYSIA 
Malaysia has a strong commitment to help in the peaceful resolution of the 
conflict between the GRP and MILF. Its interest is mainly driven by its internal socio-
economic and security concern due to the geographic proximity of its Sabah state to 
Mindanao.  Its support to the peace process is somehow linked to its efforts to establish 
better diplomatic relations with the Philippines in view of resolving the Sabah territorial 
dispute in the future. Having taken the role as third party facilitator since 2001, Malaysia 
has served as “crucial catalyst in developing supportive relationship”217 between the GRP 
and the MILF which successfully led to the progress of the peace process and big decline 
in ceasefire violations. It helped shape an attitude towards the conflict as “a problem to be 
solved and not as a contest to be won.”218  Furthermore, the Malaysian government has 
shown its commitment by providing members of its military to act as international 
monitoring teams in Mindanao. Seemingly, Malaysia is fully committed to the peaceful 
resolution of the conflict, and its expressed support of the territorial integrity of the 
Philippine Republic is crucial to the political solution of the Bangsamoro problem. 
The unstable security environment in the southern Philippines causes a huge 
influx of refugees and illegal immigrants to Sabah, Malaysia, which brings about socio-
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economic and demographic implications.219 During the height of the secessionist war in 
the early 1970s, Sabah became the destination for hundreds of thousands of Filipino 
refugees and illegal immigrants so that by 1983, around 160,000 to 200,000 Moros were 
living in Sabah.220 Today, it poses a threat to non-Muslim political parties because the 
Moros and their descendants have become one-third of the population already.221 During 
the migration period in the early 1970s, the government of Sabah state extended a policy 
of accommodation in view of humanitarian considerations until it realized the socio-
economic implication of the refugees, who competed for resources and job opportunities 
with the Sabahans.  Some have also been involved in a destabilizing street protest in 
1986.222 This condition prompted the state government to tighten its policies. Those 
illegal immigrants who arrived after 1976 were arrested and subsequently deported. This 
accounted for 4,281 deportations and detention of 11,912 Moros by 1989. 223  However, 
because of the poor security situation and unfavorable economic conditions in Mindanao, 
Filipino Muslims continue to illegally immigrate to Sabah. In Malaysia’s most recent 
drive against illegal immigrants in 2002, about 64,000 Filipinos had been forced to leave 
Malaysia's Sabah state and an estimated 4,000 Filipinos were waiting to be deported by 
August of that same year.224   
The growing lawlessness in Mindanao has also become a threat to the internal 
security of Malaysia.  Since 1979, there had been several incidents of piracy and intrusion 
of criminal elements from Mindanao. The bloodiest attack happened in August 1984 
when Moro pirates killed 33 Malaysians at sea. They also figured in the armed robbery of 
a bank and Malaysian airline office which left 10 dead and 11 wounded.225 Aside from 
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these, the most alarming incident, so far, was the daring raid made by the ASG from the 
Philippines in the year 2000 at a dive resort on Sipadan Island, Malaysia. The ASG 
kidnapped nine Malaysians, three Germans, two French, two South Africans, two Finns, 
a Lebanese woman and a Filipino, and then brought them to Sulu in Mindanao for a 
demand of $1million for the release of each foreign hostage. The ASG reportedly profited 
around $25 million.226 Certainly, it puts a black mark on Malaysia’s security and tourism 
industry. 
The participation of Malaysia in ending the MILF conflict fosters good relations 
with the Philippines, which may be a step towards the final settlement of the territorial 
dispute over Sabah in the future. The Philippines’ claim to Sabah is based on House 
Resolution No. 42 adopted on 28 April 1950, which recognized the ownership of the 
heirs of the Sultan of Sulu over Sabah.  That same house resolution authorized the 
President to negotiate on behalf of the sultan and authorized the Philippine President to 
negotiate for reasserting sovereignty of the island. In 1969, Malaysia suspended 
diplomatic ties with the Philippines because of the latter’s Republic Act 5546 that 
incorporated Sabah as part of the Philippine territory.227 The relations worsened when the 
Jabidah incident took place in 1968, which exposed President Marcos’ plan to retake 
Sabah through the use of force.228 Since then, Sabah became the training ground for the 
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Muslim rebels in Mindanao and the trans-shipment point for supplies coming from Libya, 
with the tacit agreement of the Malaysian government in the long years of the Moro 
rebellion.229 Apparently, the Sabah issue has triggered Malaysia’s support for the Moro 
rebellion.  
Malaysia now plays a key role in the GRP-MILF conflict resolution, being the 
main third party facilitator in the peace process. It acts as a guide toward developing 
collaborative behavior among the GRP-MILF panels in arriving at a consensus for the 
solution of the problem. It has been the venue of several exploratory talks, and has aided 
both parties in progressing in the peace process through various agreements.230 Its 
involvement in the peace process is further compounded by the deployment of its 
Malaysian peace monitors, headed by Maj. Gen. Dato Zulkifli Bin Mohd Zin, who arrived in the 
Philippines on October 10, 2004.231 The international monitoring team is composed of 51 
Malaysians,232 with 10 from Brunei233 and 2 Libyan234 nationals. It assists in the 
implementation of a ceasefire agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).235 Malaysia also committed to help develop the Bangsamoro 
Development Agency through its Malaysian Technical Cooperation Program (MTCP).236 It has 
made possible the signing of the agreement of unity between the two main Moro rebel factions, 
the MILF and the MNLF in a meeting held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia in 2001.237  
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As expressed, Malaysia does not support the independence struggle of the MILF 
anymore. Instead, its preferential approach is a track towards peace and development.238 
Its policy on the peace process is outlined in the following political parameters: “the 
framework of the Philippine constitution, Tripoli agreement and Jakarta accord, respect 
for Philippine territorial integrity and sovereignty, no secession or independence, 
assurance of the rights of the Bangsamoro as citizens, MNLF-MILF unity to complement 
existing solutions, and for the Moro movement to combat radicalism and militant 
tendency.”239  
B. THE UNITED STATES 
The U.S. commitment in helping to end the MILF conflict is mainly driven by its 
security concerns against terrorism, its deep historical connection with the Philippines, 
and its exiting trade relations with the country. Currently, it is playing a supportive role in 
the peace process and has already expressed interest to help by offering development 
assistance in the event a peace agreement is signed. It may also take the lead for a multi-
national peace keeping force that will provide a security guarantee240 and ensure the 
compliance of the GRP and MILF in the implementation phase of the comprehensive 
peace agreement in the future.  Its commitment to provide resources and deploy its forces 
were seen in the year 2002 during the bilateral military exercise (code named Balikatan, 
meaning shoulder to shoulder), aimed at targeting the terrorist Abu Sayyaf group in 
Mindanao. Its expressed support of the territorial integrity of the Philippine Republic 
enhances the prospect for a political solution to the conflict. 
The U.S.’ Global War on Terror policy makes it committed to the peaceful 
settlement of the MILF conflict due to the presence of terrorist groups in Mindanao, 
particularly Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf.  It sees that a peaceful solution of the 
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MILF conflict  would prevent Mindanao from becoming a major breeding ground  for 
terrorists, since having peace with the MILF would isolate these terrorists and deny them 
support and freedom of movement in the MILF controlled areas. This will also downplay 
the growing Islamic militancy in Southeast Asia because of the MILF’s influential role in 
the region in the name of Islam.241  In fact, it is the Global War on Terror that has 
brought a greater United States-Philippines security cooperation. After the 9/11 terrorist 
attack, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo offered the use of Philippine ports and 
airports for refueling U.S. ships and aircraft to help the U.S. war on terror.  President 
George W. Bush reciprocated the favor by granting military assistance amounting to $92 
million in 2001 and a separate amount of $55 million for U.S. economic aid for Muslim 
Mindanao, covering the years 2001 and 2002.242 Between January and July 2002, the 
U.S. military personnel involved in “Balikatan exercise (shoulder to shoulder)” in the 
Philippines reached a peak of 1,200. The forces included some 150 Special Forces 
personnel involved in training the Philippine military in support of its combat operations 
against the terrorists in Mindanao, particularly against the ASG at that time. The military 
assistance was also complemented with civic action projects conducted by some 300 U.S. 
Navy engineers. The training exercise was largely credited for weakening the ASG, 
especially in the neutralization of some of its notorious leaders.243 The U.S.’ shared 
security commitment in Mindanao was seen in its intention to replicate the gains of 
Balikatan military exercise by deploying approximately 3,000 troops in February 2003 in 
direct combat participation against the Abu Sayyaf, which did not materialize because of 
an impediment in the Philippine constitution. 244 
The U.S. remains consistent with its hard stance against the terrorists and in 
giving the MILF the chance for peace, which has proved helpful so far. Amidst several 
bombings in 2003 in Mindanao cities, the GRP and the U.S. demanded that the MILF 
sever its ties with the terrorist groups or else it will be included on the terror list. As a 
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result, the MILF immediately renounced terrorism as a means for its armed struggle, and 
denied its link with terrorist groups operating in Mindanao.  This led to the resumption of 
the peace negotiations.245 As discussed earlier in chapter II, there were strong reports that 
the JI was provided training camps within MILF territories from 1994 to the year 2000. 
Surely the potential gains for the peaceful settlement of the conflict and the great 
consequence of being regarded as a terrorist organization are more than enough reasons 
for the MILF to submit to the demand. Definitely, the U.S. commitment provides a 
greater chance of success to the peace process because of its capability to provide 
development assistance and to coerce parties of the conflict to remain on the peace track.  
The U.S. interest in the peace process was also based on the official request of the 
Philippine government and the separate appeal of the MILF in the year 2003. President 
Arroyo asked President Bush for assistance in the peace process during her state visit. For 
his part, the late Salamat Hashim wrote a letter to U.S. President George W. Bush 
appealing for the U.S. to correct what the MILF saw as an error of the U.S. in including 
Mindanao in the Philippine Republic when it was granted independence in 1946.246  The 
U.S. positively responded to the request for assistance in the peace process and made 
clear its following policies in June 2003. 
The content of the letter emphasizes, first and foremost: (1) the U.S. commitment 
to the territorial integrity of the Philippines; (2) recognition of serious legitimate 
grievances of the Muslims in Southern Philippines that must be addressed; (3) the U.S. 
desire to see an end to the violence and its effort to assist the Republic of the Philippines 
in addressing the root causes of the problem; (4) U.S. concern about the links of the 
MILF with terrorist organizations and its demand that those links be severed 
immediately; (5) readiness to support politically and financially, a bona fide peace 
process between the GRP and MILF; (6) recognition of and cooperation with the 
Malaysian government as the third party facilitator of conflict resolutions; (7) endorses 
the USIP as the support mechanism for the peace process in coordination with 
                                                 
245 ICG Report, 25. 
246 Santos Jr., 51. 
 78
Malaysia.247 Clearly, the U.S. does not support an independent Bangsamoro Islamic state 
in Mindanao, but it is willing to help in the peaceful settlement of the conflict and in 
addressing the MILF’s legitimate concerns politically and economically.  
The U.S.’ deep historical connection with the Philippines and its economic 
interest also provide the motivation for the U.S. to get involved in the resolution of the 
MILF conflict. As a former colonial state of the U.S., the Philippines have shared a 
history and commitment to democratic principles, as well as direct human links. The 
country’s governmental institutions are modeled after the U.S. government, except for 
not being a federal republic. There are approximately 2 million Americans of Filipino 
roots in the United States and there are more than 130,000 Americans in the 
Philippines.248 On the economic side, trade between both countries in 2004 accounted for 
$16.2 billion, of which 16% of the Philippine imports came from the U.S. and 18% of its 
exports went to the United States.  The Philippines is currently ranked as the U.S.’ 21st 
biggest export market and its 21st largest exporter. Traditionally, the U.S. has been the 
Philippines’ largest investor, which accounts for the $6.3 billion investment at the end of 
2004.249 On the average, the Philippines are visited by almost 400,000 Americans every 
year. In the year 2003, Filipinos living in the United States remitted about $4.1 billion to 
their relatives and friends in the Philippines.250 
 The RP-US relations weakened in 1991 when the Philippine Senate voted for the 
termination of the land lease for two large U.S. military bases: Subic Naval Base and 
Clark Air Force Base, located north of Manila. However, the situation gradually 
normalized and has improved significantly after the 9/11 incident. The Philippines came 
ahead of other countries to offer its cooperation with the U.S. War on Terror in 2001. It 
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also sent a military contingent to the coalition forces against Iraq in 2003. The U.S., on its 
part, supported the Philippines by providing training and equipment to the Philippine 
military who were then engaged with local terrorists in Mindanao. The Philippines was 
declared a major non-NATO ally by the U.S. during President Arroyo’s state visit in May 
2003.251 In a national sampling survey conducted by the Social Weather Station on 14 
September 2004, 78% of Filipinos believe that a good relationship with the U.S. is 
important to the country’s development, 73% say good relations with the U.S. is 
important in protecting the Philippines from international terrorists, 62% agree on 
maintaining the support of the U.S. against the Abu Sayyaf Group in Mindanao, and 22% 
of Filipinos have been found to have relatives in the U.S.252 
There are two U.S. independent institutions that are technically capable of 
undertaking peace building initiatives: the U.S. Institute of Peace and the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID). The U.S. Institute of Peace has been closely 
monitoring and supporting the peace process after President Arroyo asked President Bush 
for assistance in the peace process during her state visit in 2003.  Since mid-2003, the 
USIP has acted as an active on-the-ground facilitator between the GRP and the MILF by 
conducting studies and consultations in Mindanao. These studies were done in the 
interest of exploring various ways and means to help find solutions to the conflict. 
Relevant to the most contentious issue of the substantive agenda in the peace process is 
the recent research sponsored by the USIP on the issue of ancestral domain.253  It is also 
in close coordination with the civil society organizations in Mindanao, including the 
media, on how to generate popular support for the peace process. It sees the need to 
nurture the popularity of the peace process in order to develop awareness and 
commitment among the people of Mindanao and concerned policy makers. It has 
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expressed its commitment to assist in the post conflict social and economic development 
of Mindanao, once a peace agreement is signed.254 In the year 2003, the USIP offered $ 
30 million for development programs in Mindanao in the event that a peace agreement is 
reached.255 However, the fund was forfeited in 2004 because of budgetary policies on 
fiscal appropriations. The fund was not tapped in the period it was appropriated due to a 
non-signing of a peace agreement in that year, so it was taken back by the U.S. 
government at the end of the budget fiscal period.256  
Unknown to many, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has 
been helping former MNLF rebels develop small-scale farms to improve their living 
conditions on a self-sustaining basis. It was responsible for developing the micro-
financing capability of at least 97 local banks in order to provide micro-financing 
services to the former MNLF combatants, which benefited some 8,000 in 2002.257 In 
2004, it has considered a $50 million grant facility for development projects in the 
conflict affected areas in Mindanao, aside from the $20 million intended for the re-
integration of the MILF.258  
C.  LIBYA 
The support of Libya in the peaceful resolution of the conflict is significant 
because of its deep historical connection to the conflict and its influence over the Moros 
of Mindanao. Similar to Malaysia, Libya used to be a strong supporter of the Moro 
rebellion in the southern Philippines. It was a leader in rallying support among Muslim 
countries for the Moro rebellion in Mindanao. It provided arms and logistics to the armed 
struggle beginning in the early 1970s, which definitely heightened the intensity of 
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fighting between the Philippine military and the Moro rebels. It is widely believed that 
the fighting could not have been so fierce and wide scale had Libya not provided the 
necessary logistics to the Moro rebels. The significance of its support for the peace 
process also creates a big impact. Starting in 1976, the intensity of the fighting gradually 
reduced after President Marcos opened diplomatic relations with Libya along with other 
Middle East countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Lebanon, 
Kuwait and Algeria.259 Libya became the primary mediator of the Tripoli agreement 
signed on behalf of the GRP and MNLF, wherein both parties agreed to granting 
autonomy to thirteen provinces of the Moros, rather than giving independence in 1976.260 
Although the 1976 Tripoli agreement was short-lived, the fighting did not have the same 
intensity as in the early 1970s. 
During the resumption of the peace talks between the GRP and the MILF in June 
2001, Libya played host again and was in fact successful in achieving an agreement of 
peace. That agreement provided for the three substantive agendas of the peace 
negotiations: namely, security, rehabilitation and ancestral domain. The peace process 
has revolved on these three agenda since then. Libya also made clear its opposition to 
“dismemberment of Philippine territory by an independent Islamic state.”261   
Libya’s interest in the peace process may be considered purely altruistic and 
political, since it doesn’t have much of an economic or security agenda to pursue with the 
Philippines, except for labor force.262  The conflict does not create an immediate effect 
on Libya, unlike in Malaysia wherein its security is threatened too by the conflict. More 
likely, its historical ties with the conflict and its commitment to help the Muslim brothers 
in the southern Philippines could be the main reasons for helping in the peaceful 
settlement of the conflict. On the political side, sponsoring peaceful settlements of 
conflict rather than sponsoring violent armed struggles (that has characterized the image 
of Libya in the past) will have a positive effect on its image in the international 
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community. This may be the reason why Libya intervened for the release of the European 
citizens kidnapped from Sipadan, Malaysia and held hostage in Mindanao by the Abu 
Sayyaf in the year 2000. 
D. THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE  
The support of the OIC in the peace process with the Moros is crucial to its 
success because of the Moros’ identification with the world ummah community and its 
historical connection to the conflict. The OIC enjoys legitimacy among the Moros 
because it represents the Muslim countries that may be supporting their causes. It was 
particularly involved in the investigation of the Moros’ plight in Mindanao in 1972, 
during the height of sectarian violence between Christians and Muslims, and 
subsequently acted as mediator in the conflict. It also facilitated development initiatives 
among oil rich Muslim countries for the Moros in Mindanao, with Libya and Saudi 
Arabia in the lead.263 Like the US, Malaysia and Libya,. the OIC has been consistent in 
its policy of supporting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state as mentioned 
in the sixth Islamic summit in Dakar, Senegal in 1991.264  
The OIC can now have a more direct participation in the peaceful settlement of 
the conflict because the MNLF and the MILF have finally heeded its call for solidarity. In 
the past, the OIC could not play a direct role with the GRP-MILF peace process, due to 
its political recognition of the MNLF as the legitimate representative of the Moros in 
Mindanao.  In fact, the monitoring team in Mindanao was called as international 
monitoring team and not an OIC monitoring team, despite coming from OIC member 
countries.265 With the signing of the “agreement of unity” between the MNLF and the 
MILF in Malaysia in the year 2001, it can now actively support the peaceful resolution of 
the conflict. Definitely, the OIC’s support for the peaceful resolution of the conflict 
enhances legitimacy of the peace process and its outcome. It can also help generate 
significant support from member Muslim countries to provide the much needed funds for 
development projects in Mindanao. 
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E. UNITED NATIONS AND THE WORLD BANK   
The UN has not directly been involved in the peace negotiations between the GRP 
and the MILF, and its bystander attitude has not been healthy to the early peaceful 
resolution of the conflict. In September 2003, President Arroyo was offered assistance by 
Secretary Kofi Annan in finding a comprehensive, peaceful and lasting political solution 
to the MILF, but nothing concrete has come out of the offer.266 Presumably, the UN is 
comfortable with how the peace negotiations are progressing through the facilitation of 
Malaysia and other support groups. However, the MILF’s demand for a UN sponsored 
referendum for independence begs for the official stand of the United Nations. Its official 
declaration against the conduct of referendum for the Moros’ independence will improve 
the prospect of early resolution because this will certainly influence the political stand of 
the GRP and MILF. Its clear stand on the issue will definitely guide both sides of the 
conflict in their peace negotiations. Thus, a UN decision not to support the MILF’s quest 
for independence will put the issue to rest. Certainly, its political position on the issue 
will help with the speedy resolution of the conflict and at the same time provide 
legitimacy for the political solution.  
Despite its complacent attitude to the conflict resolution, the UN has been actively 
involved in finding solutions to the Mindanao problem. Likewise, the UN Development 
Program has been an active partner in the implementation of the 1996 peace agreement 
with the MNLF.  It helps to achieve the vision of peace and development through the 
multi-donor program.267 Furthermore, it has conducted at least six assessment missions to 
Mindanao that provide valuable input to the peace process, especially the fifth assessment 
mission report by Paul Oquist.   This proposed the need to prioritize the human security 
framework over the national security framework in view of the poor social conditions of 
the area.268 Such input is very relevant considering the poor security and unfavorable 
economic conditions of the affected areas in Mindanao.  
                                                 




The World Bank’s participation is confined to the economic development aspect 
of the peace process, particularly in generating funds to support the peace settlement. It 
has taken the lead of a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) for the humanitarian, 
rehabilitation and development of the war-devastated areas in Mindanao. So far, a most 
concrete action made by the WB is the conduct of joint needs assessment (JNA) that 
deals with the areas of human development, finance and private sector, rural 
development, governance and institutions.269 Just like in other post-conflict undertakings 
for peace and development, there is a big need for donor countries to provide funds to 
finance valuable projects and job opportunities to the people in the community.  What 
has also been concrete and helpful is the decision of the donor countries to provide the 
development aid after the final peace agreement is signed between the GRP and the 
MILF.270 Such a policy serves as an impetus for both sides of the conflict to stick to the 
negotiated settlement track.  The same policy is being observed by Japan, which is 
assisting bilaterally.   Japan has been increasingly involved in providing development 
assistance to Mindanao. It has pledged a total of US $400 million to support the peace 
and development of Mindanao. In a speech delivered to the MILF’s General Assembly in 
May 2005, Taeko Takahashi, a high level Japanese official to the Philippines, emphasized 
the need for peace before development could flourish. She reiterated Japan’s continuing 
support for development in Mindanao should the MILF remain on the peace track.271
 The convergence of these offers of development assistance from the donor 
countries should make it difficult for the MILF to abandon the peaceful settlement track 
as it sees the huge potential economic gains in the future.  
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F. CONCLUSION 
The GRP-MILF peace process has received significant attention from other 
countries and intergovernmental institutions which are now rendering various ways of 
support. This participation of external actors enhances the legitimacy of the peace process 
and its potential political solution in the future. Furthermore, the expressed support of the 
U.S., Malaysia, Libya, and the OIC for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the 
Philippine Republic helps promote the acceptability of a political solution other than 
independence because it de-popularizes, if not de-legitimizes, the issue of independence.  
So far, the involvement of third parties has proven very effective. It has aided the 
GRP-MILF in stabilizing the security conditions on the ground and carefully advanced 
the peace negotiations. This multinational involvement was definitely absent during the 
peace talks with the MILF in 1997 to 2000, which may be blamed for the peace talks’ 
failure and the escalation of violence that happened. In the history of the Moro rebellion, 
peace agreements were achieved in 1976 and 1996 with the MILF through the facilitation 
of Libya and Indonesia respectively. On the other hand, the absence of a third party 
facilitator was proven dangerous in the GRP-MILF negotiations from 1997 to year 2000. 
Both sides failed to develop a collaborative problem solving attitude, and instead 
maintained a competing rivalry characterized by mistrust and gaining advantage over the 
other. So far, Malaysia has been effective in its role, given the current success of both 
sides to reach several agreements to stabilize the security condition and promote the talks 
near to the final settlement.  
Malaysia will continue to support the peaceful resolution of the conflict with the 
MILF because it sees Mindanao as vital to its own security and socio-economic stability. 
As seen in the past incidents, it is affected by the huge migration of Moros fleeing the 
fighting because they impact on Sabah’s demography and also reduces economic 
opportunities for the Sabahans.  More importantly, it is threatened by the growing 
lawlessness in Mindanao due to the conflict. Incidents in the past have shown the 
intrusion of pirates and terrorists on Malaysian soil. Thus Malaysia would prefer to have 
a more stable Mindanao because this will definitely mean a more secured environment 
for its part.  
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The Malaysian support for the peaceful settlement of the conflict has a significant 
effect in achieving sustainable peace in Mindanao. It has been noted in the past that 
Malaysia was a major supporter of the Bangsamoro armed struggle for independence, as 
it provided sanctuary, training and equipment to the Moro rebels, especially during the 
time of Tun Mustapha in the 1970s.272 Today, the armed struggle for independence has 
not only lost a major supporter, but is greatly weakened by Malaysia’s active 
involvement in the peace process. Similarly, the support of Libya for the peaceful 
resolution of the conflict provides better chances for achieving sustainability of peace in 
Mindanao. Libya was also a major supporter of the Moro armed rebellion in the past. Its 
change of policy from providing the rebels with the means to fight to supporting the 
peaceful solution decreases the capability of the MILF to wage another wide scale armed 
struggle. 
The United States will always be willing to participate in the peaceful settlement 
of the conflict with the MILF because its success will have a positive impact on its 
Global War on Terror. Peace with the MILF will lessen the terrorists’ recruitment base 
and deny them freedom of movement in MILF controlled areas. Moreso, if the MILF will 
be co-opted to fight against terrorists, its members can be helpful in providing vital 
intelligence information about the terrorists. Furthermore, the United States will always 
be committed on the war on terror in Mindanao because of its big number of citizens 
living and visiting in the Philippines that need to be protected from terrorist attacks, not 
to mention some economic interest discussed in this chapter. Thus, it is more likely a 
willing partner to consolidate peace in the post-conflict environment of Mindanao. Its 
commitment to Philippine security had already been seen in the robust military exercise 
codenamed “Balikatan” (shoulder to shoulder) in the year 2002. It has also been 
committed to providing a substantial amount of resources and huge military forces for 
combined training, which directly and indirectly helped the Philippine military in the 
fight against the ASG.273  
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By looking at the peace settlement as part of the war against terror, the United 
States may take the lead role of a multinational peace keeping force in the 
implementation phase of the agreement, particularly regarding the security aspect of 
either disarmament, demobilization or integration of the MILF rebels to GRP military 
and police, as may be agreed upon in the peace process. As the world’s leading 
superpower, it has the capability to support peace and development programs of the peace 
agreement due to its huge resources, and the military capability to coerce both adversaries 
to remain committed to the peaceful resolution of the conflict, a role that Malaysia may 
neither be willing to perform nor effectively assume.  
The economic development assistance from the international community, through 
the facilitation of the UN and World Bank of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Mindanao, 
creates an irresistible force for encouraging the MILF to embrace the road to peace. 
Considering the region as the poorest among other regions of the country, economic 
development remains a great aspiration of the people in Mindanao. Other countries’ 
significant contributions for development assistance, including that of Japan, would be 
very influential for the GRP and MILF to fulfill the consolidation of peace.  Libya and 
the OIC will remain supportive to the peace process and provide development assistance 
because of their historical and religious connections with the Moros. The UN and the WB 
is crucial in facilitating the use of the needed contributions of donor countries in order to 
implement developmental projects. Undoubtedly, the support of these countries and 
international government institutions positively impact in the prospect for sustainable 
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V.  SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The contemporary MILF rebellion is mainly part of an ethno-nationalistic struggle 
of the Moros for independence that originated from a combination of factors.  Its 
grievance issue is mainly traced to the state’s settlement programs for Christians and land 
policies that caused the socio- political and economic marginalization of the Moros, as 
they have become the minority group with very little land left to them in their homeland. 
This culminated in the massacre of 31 young Moro recruits on  Corregidor Island by the  
military in 1968, which became the mobilizing opportunity to popularize the issue of 
independence among the Moros. The MNLF emerged in 1969 and started to wage the 
armed struggle in the 1970s. In 1976 it entered into a peace agreement with the Philippine 
government through the effective mediation of Libya. However, it was a failure because 
Marcos and Misuari had opposing views on the agreement’s implementation. Twenty 
years after, President Ramos turned out successful in reviving the peace talks and signing 
a final peace agreement in 1996 which provides for wider political powers and 
development programs for the Moros. Misuari’s compromise on the issue of 
independence in 1976 stirred serious rift in the leadership. In 1977, the MILF broke away 
from the MNLF due to ideological differences. It did not want to compromise the issue of 
independence, unlike the MNLF. Furthermore, the MILF wanted to make Islam the 
center of governance. The period of the conflict, which saw the rise of sectarian violence 
in the early 1970s, further deepened animosities and racial prejudices among Christians 
and Moros. Since then, mistrust characterizes the kind of social relationship between 
Christians and Moros, not only in Mindanao but it is likely for the whole country as well.  
Apparently, the intensity of the fighting would not have been very fierce and large 
scale had it not been for the support of the external actors. Libya and Malaysia provided 
the means by which the Moros were able to put up its armies, acquire weapons and 
equipment, and establish sanctuary in Sabah. This suggests that the best way to address 
the insurgency was to gain the support of the external actors for the peaceful settlement 
of the conflict. President Marcos had this in mind in the early 1970s when he initiated 
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diplomatic relations with the OIC, more particularly with Libya. He was able to co-opt 
Libya into a peaceful resolution of the conflict, which resulted in the 1976 Tripoli 
agreement. Although the peace agreement failed in the implementation phase, the 
renewed fighting never had the same intensity as before. Twenty years later, involving 
another third party (Indonesia) in the conflict resolution still proved effective. President 
Ramos successfully reached a final peace agreement with the MNLF in 1996. Perhaps 
one of the reasons why the peace negotiations with the MILF failed in the year 2000 may 
be attributed to the absence of a third party involvement.  
Undoubtedly, the MILF is the main rebel group in Mindanao today and a peaceful 
settlement with it would improve the prospects for peace in Mindanao. The MILF has 
grown into a formidable guerilla force of 15,000, controlling large territories in central 
Mindanao. Since its formation, it has remained consistent to its twin goals of 
independence and establishing an Islamic state. Its mass base consists mainly of 
Maguindanaoans and Maranaos, and it also has supporters from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Pakistan, and Malaysia. The MILF is now a politico-military organization. It has an 
executive council, a supreme Islamic court, and a legislative branch called Majilis al-
Shura. Its Bangsamoro Islamic Army, which used to be organized into six territorial 
divisions before the major offensive by the military in the year 2000, is now organized 
into nine base commands with more or less six brigades each, and a separate special 
operations group.  
B. CONCLUSION 
The prospect for a sustainable peace between the GRP and the MILF is relatively 
good because of the following favorable conditions: the conflict seems ripe for 
resolution; the ceasefire is holding and the peace process has been progressing towards a 
negotiated political settlement; there is active support from the international community, 
particularly by Malaysia, acting as third party facilitator, and the U.S., which has 
expressed its support in the peace process and the commitment to act as a likely 
implementer of the final peace agreement in the future; and lastly, there is active 
participation of the civil society groups.  
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There are several factors in the MILF conflict that lend ripeness for resolution, but 
it is the condition of a mutually hurting stalemate that makes it more pronounced. The 
MILF has been badly weakened by the major hostilities in 2000 and the government has 
also been hurt by the loss of lives and the war’s economic cost. There is no clear 
indication that continuing the fight would result in the victory or defeat of the other, but it 
is clear that resuming hostilities would create more undesirable outcomes for both 
groups. Experts estimate the cost of the three decade conflict in Mindanao at roughly $2 - 
$3 billion dollars with 120,000 deaths and millions of emmigrants. It also contributed to 
the alarming poverty incidence among the populace in the region:  56 % in 1991, 62.5% 
in 1997, and 71.3 % in the year 2000.274 At the peak of the conflict with the MILF in the 
year 2000, the Philippine government suffered 200 soldiers killed in action and spent 
some $20 million, with daily expenses ranging from $200,000 to 400,000.275 On the part 
of the MILF, it lost many of its members and 50 of its camps to the military, including 
the main camps Bushra and Abu-bakar. It also caused the MILF’s semi-conventional 
force to disperse into smaller units.276  Fighting was even more painful for them because 
the battle grounds are their communities. This creates far reaching effects on their 
relatives who were either caught in the crossfire or forced to stay at evacuation centers. 
Another deterring factor is the potentially catastrophic outcome due to the ethno-
nationalistic color of the conflict. It should be remembered that the conflict is almost a 
proxy war between Christians and Muslims who have developed animosities towards 
each other over decades of struggle for resources and  power.  
Furthermore, the condition of widespread poverty provides a high interest in 
peace and development incentives that is incorporated in the security and rehabilitation 
agenda of the peace process. For the rebels, the potential economic gains of the peace 
process might be difficult incentives to resist. Lastly, the change in leadership due to the 
death of Hashim Salamat and the rise of Al Haj Murad as the new chairman provides for 
more flexibility in seeking other solutions, unlike his predecessor. Murad is not a 
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religious leader, and he may be less committed to independence and Islamic state 
demands.277  
The ceasefire on the ground is holding and the peace talks have been progressing. 
So far, there has been a dramatic decrease in ceasefire violations from both camps, due to 
the effective deployments of IMTs, LMTs, AHJAG, and the NGO based ceasefire watch, 
bantay ceasefire. These mechanisms monitor the ceasefire implementation on the ground 
and conducts fact finding missions on reported violations.  The presence of these 
monitoring teams has kept both sides committed to the cessation of hostilities, which 
resulted in a marked decline of ceasefire violations. 278 Likewise, some concrete actions 
have already been undertaken on the rehabilitation agenda, such as the creation of the 
Mindanao Multi-Donor Trust Fund by the World Bank and the creation of the 
Bangsamoro Development Agency. WB and BDA had already conducted a Joint Needs 
Assessments in the affected areas.  Just recently, both panels reached an agreement on 
how to approach the most contentious agenda: the ancestral domain issue, although 
details of this have not been made available as of this time. The peace process is now 
leading towards the political solution of the conflict, which brings both panels to the 
issues of either independence, as the MILF desires, or a Bangsamoro state under a 
parliamentary federalist Philippines, which the government is willing to grant based on 
the recent political trend in the country.  
The prospects for a sustainable peace between the GRP and MILF is further 
enhanced by the international attention it is getting from concerned countries and 
intergovernmental institutions that have various levels of involvement, such as Malaysia, 
the United States, Libya, the OIC, and the World Bank.  Malaysia’s effective facilitating 
role has guided both the GRP and MILF into achieving various agreements that have 
advanced the talks into the last agenda of ancestral domain and a negotiated political 
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solution to the conflict. It was responsible for assisting the peace panel in tackling the 
three substantive agendas of security, rehabilitation, and ancestral domain. Furthermore, 
it has committed the largest number of members to the IMT that have been deployed to 
Mindanao since October 2004, and expressed its willingness to assist in the technical 
development of the BDA.279   
Malaysia will continue to actively support in the peaceful resolution of the 
conflict because it has clearly identified Mindanao as crucial to its own security and 
socio-economic concerns. It prefers to have a stable Mindanao neighbor because only 
then can it minimize the influx of Moros to Sabah, which affects in the demographics and 
tight competition for economic opportunities.280 Furthermore, a secured Mindanao 
environment will help prevent piracy and lawless elements from staging criminal 
activities in Malaysian territories, such as the case of the kidnapping of tourists in 
Sipadan, Malaysia in 2000.  However, Malaysia is not likely to be seen as an effective 
implementer of the peace agreement in the future.  This is because it does not have the 
capability of a great power that can make a long term commitment to deploy resources 
and troops in ensuring a party’s compliance with the agreement during the 
implementation phase. Nevertheless, considering Mindanao as vital to its own security, it 
is more likely to be willing to commit a certain number of troops as part of a likely peace 
keeping force in the future. Undoubtedly, Malaysia’s participation in the peace process is 
a big gain for the prospects of peace. In the past, the Moro rebels received training and 
equipment, and were provided sanctuary in Sabah, which contributed to the high intensity 
level of the armed struggle.281  
Similarly, the United States will continue to actively support the peaceful 
settlement of the conflict because it has identified Mindanao as vital to its own security. 
In view of its current Global War on Terror, the United States would not allow 
Mindanao’s security condition to deteriorate further, becoming a major breeding ground 
of terrorists in Southeast Asia. A peaceful resolution of the MILF conflict will mean a 
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success for the GWOT because this will not only deny the JI and ASG terror groups from 
having access to MILF controlled areas, but it would also discourage a growing Islamic 
militancy in the region.282  
The United States is highly capable of playing the role of an effective 
implementer, or one that may take the lead of a multi-national peace keeping force. The 
U.S. role as implementer is important because it can ensure that the GRP and the MILF 
stay honest to their peace agreement and to its implementation. It is capable to take the 
lead of a multi-national peace keeping force in Mindanao, especially in the disarmament, 
demobilization or integration of the MILF combatants into the regional security force. 
Likewise, the U.S. support for peace and development is also highly important because of 
its technical capability and resources. In fact, the USIP has initially allocated the amount 
of $30 million for peace and development programs in Mindanao, in the event a peace 
agreement is signed between the GRP and MILF.283 Another U.S. government agency 
involved in peace building is the USAID, which has the capability to support economic 
development programs in the affected areas. The USAID has already been in Mindanao 
for several years, supporting the reintegration of the MNLF rebels into society through 
various livelihood programs since the signing of the GRP-MNLF peace agreement in 
1996.284  
The support of Libya, the OIC, the UN and the WB for the peace process  adds 
hope for the prospects of sustainable peace. Like Malaysia, Libya was once a major 
supporter of the Moros’ armed struggle in the past. Today, its support for the peaceful 
settlement of the conflict greatly diminishes the Moros’ means to carry out the armed 
struggle. Furthermore, its influence over the Moros may help soften the stance of the 
MILF with its demand for independence. The support of the UN and the OIC as 
internationally recognized institutions provides legitimacy to the peace process and its 
settlement outcome. Given the poor economic conditions of the affected areas in 
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Mindanao, the World Bank’s support would definitely aid the rehabilitation and 
development programs for the people in the affected areas. More importantly, the 
expressed support of these countries and the OIC for the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of the Philippines helps de-legitimize the MILF’s quest for independence, 
which may likely influence the rebels to accept a compromise. Nevertheless, the UN 
must take a more active role in the peace process by helping clarify where it stands on the 
issue of the Moro independence, in order to guide the GRP and the MILF on the political 
solution to the problem. 
Lastly, the active involvement of the civil societies in cultivating a culture of 
peace in the region gives a bright hope to the peace process. The Mindanaw Peace 
Weavers, a coalition of about eight civil society groups supportive of the peace process, 
has been proven effective in developing popular support for the peaceful settlement of the 
conflict. It also acts as a pressure group for the GRP and MILF to continue working on 
the peace negotiations. In view of the ethno-religious character of the conflict, the 
Bishop-Ulama Forum plays a strategic role in bridging the gap between Christians and 
Muslims for peace because they have the means and influence over their people. The 
religious sector in the region has a wide network that permeates almost every locality.  
Christian churches and Muslim mosques are present in almost every municipality where 
people pray and listen to religious leaders.  
Bangsamoro independence may not be the answer to the MILF conflict, given the 
reality of a social mix-up among Christians and Moros, regardless of which group is 
majority or minority in certain areas of Mindanao.  Independence will not change the 
social and economic interactions between Christians and Moros, because they live in the 
same geographic locations in Mindanao. Separating them further by creating a sovereign 
Bangsamoro government may only enhance racial prejudices that may still result in a 
violent relationship.  Definitely, the answer to the conflict should be developing a culture 
of peaceful co-existence by bridging the two main ethnic groups of the conflict, rather 
than segregating them any further.  This can be done by incorporating a comprehensive 
reconciliation program in the final peace agreement of the GRP and MILF. This 
reconciliation program must allow wider participation of the civil society organizations, 
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particularly the interfaith group that would foster a culture of peace at the village and 
national level. It should also be incorporated in the school curriculum nationwide, such 
that there will be better understanding of each groups’ cultural sensitivities. The military 
and the MILF rebels should also be designated as major components of this program, as 
well as concerned public officials in the local areas.  
A Bangsamoro state under a Philippine federal republic may be a political 
solution. Time and again, the MILF has rejected the autonomy idea because of its failure 
to bring about peace and development, as in the case of the MNLF. In this case, pursuing 
an autonomy option faces a stigma of failure, which makes it hard for the MILF to 
accept. On the part of the government, it cannot compromise its territorial integrity 
because of the constitutional impediment, and its security and economic concerns. In this 
regard, the support of the international community for the territorial integrity of the 
Philippine republic should provide the direction towards the political solution. An 
independent Bangsamoro state cannot exist without international recognition because it is 
crucial to the legitimacy of an independent state.  The United States, Libya, Malaysia and 
the OIC do not support an independent Bangsamoro state in Mindanao, but instead 
expressed that the problem should be solved within the context of Philippine sovereignty. 
None has come out to support an independent Bangasamoro state so far. Hence, the most 
viable political solution, assuming both stick to a collaborative problem solving 
approach, is the concept of a Muslim state under a Federal Republic of the Philippines. In 
this way, the Moros will be able to exercise greater political powers and adapt Islamic 
laws into the new polity with less national political intervention.  Thus, the Moros’ self-
determination would be exercised and their rights would be more protected.  
The issue of Moro landlessness remains as a valid issue of today. However, 
current laws about property rights are obstacles to retaking the lands from registered 
owners who cleared, cultivated, and nurtured the land for decades. Instead, an integrative 
solution must be pursued. The government should explore other means to provide lands 
to the Moros and support them with technical and financial assistance in order to make 
these lands economically productive.   Collectively, the Moros should be allowed to 
regain control and manage their ancestral domain for their economic benefits. However, a 
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serious effort must be undertaken to develop local capacity in governance. In the past, the 
local governments in these affected areas were tainted by poor performance owing to 
issues of incompetence and corruption among local officials.285 
Despite the good prospects, there are also certain issues that serve as obstacles to 
achieving sustainable peace, such as: the internal problems of the MILF; its consistent 
demand for an independent Islamic state; a lack of active support from the local Christian 
politicians; and the current national political crisis.  
The MILF leadership must regain its cohesive control of the organization in order 
to preserve the gains of the peace process. In doing so, it must strengthen its grip over its 
field commanders and ensure their cooperation in the peaceful resolution of the conflict. 
In this way, the local commanders will be more compelled to observe the ceasefire 
agreement and actively prevent terrorists from operating in the MILF controlled areas. 
The reported ties with JIs may endanger the MILF’s chances for the peace process 
because this may cause them to be placed on the terror list. When this happens, the peace 
dialogue will break down and turn into a resumption of hostilities, this time with the aid 
of the United States in view of its GWOT. Hence, the MILF should take the lead in 
arresting these terrorists within its areas of control or offer information about their 
whereabouts. Only then can it show its sincere renouncement of terrorism, and 
demonstrate that its reported ties with terrorists are untrue. It should also harmonize the 
relationship of Maranaos and Maguindanaoans, who largely comprise the MILF, in order 
to prevent factionalism that has been noted during the selection of the new chairman 
when Salamat Hashim died in 2003. 286  One way to keep the harmony is to keep the 
balance of the two ethnic groups in key positions of the organization. 
The MILF’s consistent demand for a UN sponsored referendum for independence 
only shows a potential stalemate in the future talks of the GRP-MILF peace panels. So 
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far, the MILF seems determined to pursue UN participation on this issue. This may likely 
cause a delay owing to the bureaucratic process of UN intervention. This may also be 
unacceptable to the GRP, which has been willing to give anything, except independence. 
Hence, a worst case scenario that may occur is for the GRP-MILF to revert back to the 
hard, competitive attitude on the issue of independence. On the other hand, non-
involvement of the UN to resolve the issue of independence will serve as an impetus for 
the pro-independence Moros to de-legitimize the political outcome of the ongoing peace 
process, and still insist for the UN intervention.  
The absence of the influential Mindanao Christian political leaders in the peace 
process is an indication of their bystander attitude, which may become a problem in the 
implementation of the agreement in the future. Known provincial and municipal leaders 
have been opposed to giving concessions to the Moros in the past287 and their non-
participation in the peace process only shows they may not be willing to implement terms 
of peace agreements in the future.  Lastly, the national political crisis is not in any way 
helpful to the peace process, except for hastening the shift towards a parliamentary 
federal republic that may pave the way for a Bangsamoro state. The crisis may undermine 
the government’s legitimacy to enter into a final peace agreement with the rebels, owing 
to the decreasing popularity of the present government. Likewise, concessions to the 
Moros will be likely targets of criticism by the President’s political opponents. What is 
worse, a serious political crisis that may result in the toppling of the incumbent President 
will definitely draw back the peace negotiations.  
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
In view of the positive developments of the peace process towards signing a 
comprehensive peace agreement between the GRP and the MILF, it is recommended that 
the potential peace agreement allows for the participation of external actors in the 
implementation phase of the peace agreement. The agreement should invite a 
multinational peace keeping force led by a major power country that has a stake in 
achieving sustainable peace in the region. The peace keeping force will serve as a third 
party implementer of the agreement, especially on the security issue of disarmament, 
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demobilization and reintegration of the rebel combatants, or in the integration of these 
rebels into a regional security and police forces.  Secondly, the peace agreement must 
also provide for establishing and implementing a comprehensive reconciliation program 
in Mindanao.  This would be intended to heal the long standing animosities and racial 
prejudices between Christians and Muslims at the grassroots level, in which the military 
and the MILF rebels should also be part of the undertaking.  This should be done by 
creating a Mindanao Reconciliation Commission that will spearhead this program. Lastly, 
the economic development of the affected areas should be composed of short term and 
long term projects that would create immediate impact and sustainable growth. It must 
provide immediate employment to the rebels and their families, coupled with building 
infrastructures. In this regard, the Bangsamoro development agency must be fully 
prepared and supported by the Philippine government and the external parties. 
In addition, the Philippine government must involve the regional and local 
political leaders in Mindanao, be they Christians or Muslims, at certain levels or areas in 
the peace process in order to develop among them ownership of the political solution. In 
this way, they will have greater commitment to the implementation of the agreements in 
the future.   
The Philippine government should actively support the civil society organizations 
in their efforts to develop ownership of the peaceful resolution of the conflict among the 
Filipino people.  This can be done by initiating dialogues and public debates to discuss 
the issues in local and national fora. In this regard, the government can use its own media 
networks or sponsor other media outfits in popularizing the peace track. 
The national government may develop a sponsor support program wherein 
progressive cities in the country, which are mostly majority a Christian majority, can be 
tapped to act as partners for development in the affected areas.  This can be done by 
allowing these cities to adopt a municipality of their choice and assist it in areas of 
governance and development. This process would definitely help bring about closer 
relationship and enhance the chances of the affected areas for development.  
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The road to peace between the GRP and MILF is definitely wider than ever before 
due to the existing favorable conditions seen in this study. Both sides have already shown 
greater commitment to resolve the conflict peacefully as shown by their collaborative 
behavior at the negotiating table and in implementing the ceasefire on the ground. Their 
efforts are being strengthened by the active involvement of civil society organizations, 
external countries, and international institutions supporting the peaceful settlement of the 
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